The 'Ten-Thousand-Word Letter' (Appendix — written by Peng Dehuai, not by Mao Zedong)

To the Chairman:

This Lushan conference is an important one. I interjected several times in our northwest small group, and some opinions I did not finish in the group meetings I now set down specially for your reference. But I am a simple soul, rather like Zhang Fei — truly coarse, without his finer strokes. Whether the following has any reference value, please weigh for yourself. Where it is off the mark, I beg your correction.

A. The achievements of the Great Leap Forward of 1958 are beyond doubt.

Judging by the several verified indices of the State Planning Commission, in 1958 the total output value of industry and agriculture rose 48.4 per cent over 1957 — industry by 66.1 per cent, agriculture and side-occupations by 25 per cent (a 30 per cent increase in grain and cotton is certain), and state fiscal revenue by 43.5 per cent. Such a rate of growth has never been seen in any country of the world. It broke through the established conventions on the speed of socialist construction; and especially in a country like ours with a weak economic base and backward technical equipment, the Great Leap Forward has basically confirmed that the general line of greater, faster, better and more economical results is correct. It is not only a great achievement of our country; it will long play an active part in the socialist camp as well.

In the capital construction of 1958, some projects, as we now see, were pressed too fast and too many, diverting part of the funds and delaying part of the projects that had to be completed — this is a shortcoming. Its basic cause is inexperience; our grasp of the point was shallow and our recognition too late. Hence in 1959 we not only failed to slow the pace somewhat and exercise proper control, but continued the great leap, so that the imbalances were not adjusted in time and new, temporary difficulties were added. Yet these undertakings are, after all, needed by the nation's construction, and within the next year or two, or perhaps a little longer, their benefits will gradually be felt. There are still some missing links and weak points, so that production cannot be complete in sets, and some materials lack the reserves that are absolutely necessary; when dislocation occurs and new imbalances appear, they are hard to adjust in time — this is where the present difficulty lies. Therefore, in drawing up next year's plan (1960) we should give still more serious thought to placing it on a basis of seeking truth from facts and of sureness and reliability. Some capital-construction projects of 1958 and the first half of 1959 simply cannot be finished, and the greatest resolve must be used to halt them for the present. In this there must be giving up if there is to be gaining; otherwise the grave dislocations will be prolonged, the passive position in certain respects will be hard to escape, and the leap-forward speed of catching up with and surpassing Britain within the coming four years will be hindered. The State Planning Commission has its arrangements, but for various reasons firm decisions are hard to reach.

The communisation of the countryside in 1958 was of great significance: not only will it free our peasants thoroughly from poverty, it is also the correct road for accelerating the building of socialism and moving toward communism. Although there was a period of confusion over the question of ownership, and shortcomings and errors appeared in the concrete work — certainly a serious phenomenon — yet through the series of conferences at Wuchang, Zhengzhou, Shanghai and elsewhere it has been basically corrected; the confusion is basically past, and things have gradually come onto the normal track of distribution according to labour.

In the Great Leap Forward of 1958 the problem of unemployment was solved. In a country of so numerous a population and such a backward economy, so swift a solution is no small matter but a great one.

In the nationwide steel-making, a good many small native blast furnaces were built and some resources (material and financial) and manpower were wasted — certainly a rather large loss. But we gained a huge preliminary survey of the geology of the whole country, trained a good number of technical personnel, and the broad ranks of cadres were tempered and raised in this movement. Though a school fee was paid (a subsidy of more than two billion), even in this respect there was loss and gain alike.

Judging from these few points alone, the achievements are truly great. But there are also many deep lessons of experience, and to analyse them conscientiously is necessary and beneficial.

B. How to sum up the lessons of experience in our work:

At this conference the comrades present are all exploring the lessons of experience in the work of the past year and more, and have put forward many useful opinions. Through this discussion our Party's work will gain great benefit: passivity in certain respects will become initiative, our grasp of the laws of the socialist economy will be deepened, the ever-present imbalances will be adjusted in time, and the meaning of “active balance” will be correctly understood.

As I see it, some of the shortcomings and errors that appeared in the Great Leap Forward of 1958 were unavoidable. As in the successive revolutionary movements our Party has led for over thirty years, there are always shortcomings amid great achievements — they are two aspects of one question. The outstanding contradiction facing us in construction work now is the tension in every field caused by the dislocation of proportions. In its nature, the development of this situation has already affected the relations between workers and peasants, among the various strata of the cities, and among the various strata of the peasantry; it therefore has a political character as well. It touches the very key to whether we can in future mobilise the broad masses to continue carrying out the leap forward.

This letter is not Mao Zedong's work. Addressed 'Chairman:', with the line 'as the Chairman indicated at this conference' in the body and signed 'Peng Dehuai', it is plainly a subordinate's letter to a superior. Therefore this edition places it in the appendix, separate from the twenty-three main-body pieces.

The shortcomings and errors of the past period had many causes. The objective factor is our unfamiliarity with socialist construction — we have no complete body of experience. Our grasp of the law of planned, proportionate development of socialism is shallow, and the policy of walking on two legs has not been carried into the concrete work of every field. In handling the questions of economic construction we are still far from that easy mastery we showed in handling political questions such as the shelling of Quemoy and the quelling of the rebellion in Tibet. On the other side, the objective situation was our country's backward state of “poverty and blankness” (some people still cannot fill their bellies; last year cotton cloth averaged only eighteen chi per head — enough for one unlined suit and two pairs of underpants), and the people urgently demanded a change in the status quo; and next, the favourable trend of the international situation. These too were important factors urging us to the great leap. To use this favourable opportunity, answer the demands of the broad masses, speed up our construction, change our poor-and-blank backward face as quickly as possible and create a still more favourable international position — that was entirely necessary and correct.

In the past period, our way of thinking and our style of work have also laid bare quite a few problems deserving attention. They are chiefly these:

1. The wind of exaggeration has grown rather widely. At the Beidaihe conference last year the grain output was over-estimated, creating a false appearance. Everyone felt the grain question had been solved, so that hands could be freed for a great drive in industry. In our understanding of the development of iron and steel there was serious one-sidedness: we failed conscientiously to study steel-making, rolling and stone-crushing equipment, coal, ore and coking plant, the sources of pit-props, transport capacity, the increase of labour power, the expansion of purchasing power, how the goods on the market were to be arranged, and so on. In short, there was no necessary plan of balance. Here again was the fault of not seeking truth from facts. This was probably the origin of a whole series of problems. The wind of exaggeration blew across every region and department; even incredible “miracles” appeared in the press, and did in truth inflict heavy losses on the Party's prestige. From the reports and materials of the time it seemed communism might arrive very soon, and the brains of many comrades grew feverish. In the wave of high grain-and-cotton yields and doubled steel output, extravagance and waste grew apace; the autumn harvest was gathered roughly, cost was never reckoned, and poor days were lived as rich days. What was grave was that for quite a long stretch it was not easy to get at the true situation; right up to the Wuchang conference and the January meeting of provincial and municipal committee secretaries, the whole truth had still not been cleared up. This wind of exaggeration had its social causes, which deserve careful study. It is also connected with the fact that in some of our work there were only task targets and no concrete measures. Although the Chairman warned the whole Party a year ago to combine dauntless drive with scientific analysis, and gave the policy of walking on two legs, it appears they were not grasped by the majority of leading comrades — and I was no exception.

2. Petty-bourgeois fever made us prone to errors of the “Left.” In the Great Leap Forward of 1958, I, like many other comrades, was dazzled by the achievements of the leap and the enthusiasm of the mass movement; certain “Left” tendencies developed to a considerable degree; we always wanted to stride into communism in one step, and the spirit of racing ahead held sway for a time; the mass line and the style of seeking truth from facts, formed by the Party over long years, were cast to the winds. In our way of thinking we constantly confused strategic dispositions with concrete measures, long-term policies with immediate steps, the whole with the part, the larger collective with the smaller. The calls put forward by the Chairman, such as “sow less, yield high, reap much” and “catch up with Britain in fifteen years,” belong to strategic, long-term policy; but we failed to study them, paid no attention to studying the present concrete situation, and did not place our work on a basis at once active and sure and reliable. Some targets were raised level by level, each tier adding its quota, until requirements that would need several years or a dozen were turned into targets to be met in one year or a few months. Thus we lost touch with reality and could not win the masses' support. Such things as denying the law of equal value in exchange prematurely, raising prematurely the call of “free meals,” the cancelling for a time of the state marketing policy in certain regions on the ground that grain was in surplus, the advocacy of eating one's fill without restraint, the reckless spread of certain techniques without appraisal, and the facile negation of some economic laws and scientific principles — all were “Left” tendencies. In the view of these comrades, once “politics in command” is proclaimed it can substitute for everything; they forgot that politics in command means raising labour consciousness and ensuring the rise of the quantity and quality of products, giving play to the masses' activity and creativeness, and thereby accelerating our economic construction. Politics in command cannot substitute for economic laws, still less for the concrete measures of economic work. Politics in command and exact, effective measures in economic work must be given equal weight; neither may be favoured at the other's expense, neither may be abandoned. To correct these “Left” phenomena is generally harder than to combat Right-conservative thinking — our Party's historical experience has proved this. In the second half of last year there seemed to arise an atmosphere in which attention was paid to combating Right-conservative thinking while the subjective “Left” side was neglected. After the series of measures following the Zhengzhou conference last winter, some “Left” phenomena were basically set right — a great victory. This victory educated the comrades of the whole Party and at the same time did not injure their enthusiasm.

Now the domestic situation has been basically clarified, and especially through the recent conferences the understanding of the majority of comrades in the Party has become basically unanimous. The present task is for the whole Party to unite as one and go on working hard. I think it would be most beneficial to sum up systematically the achievements and lessons of our work since the second half of last year, so as to educate the whole Party further. The aim is to distinguish right from wrong and raise thinking, and in general not to pursue individual responsibility; the opposite course would harm unity and harm the cause. As for unfamiliarity with such questions as the laws of socialist construction, through the practice and exploration since the second half of last year some questions can be cleared up, and others can be mastered after a further period of study and groping. As for questions of thinking and style of work, we have had this deep lesson, and it makes us readier to wake and to understand; but to overcome them thoroughly will still take arduous effort. As the Chairman instructed at this conference: “The achievements are great, the problems many, the experience rich, the future bright.” The initiative lies with us; the conditions exist for the whole Party to unite in arduous struggle and continue the leap. The plans for this year, next year and the four years to come will certainly be victoriously completed; the goal of catching up with Britain in fifteen years can be basically realised within the next four, and in certain important products we can certainly surpass Britain. Such are our great achievements and our bright future.

With respect and

salutations!

Peng Dehuai

Part A lists the growth figures of total industrial and agricultural output, industry and farm sidelines, and fiscal revenue in 1958, and says the construction projects were over-hasty and over-many; part B criticises the wind of exaggeration and the petty-bourgeois fever. Besides parts A and B there is an opening passage of self-deprecating explanation.

The figure 1974 at the end of a line is a scanning or recognition artefact of the base text. The Lushan Conference was in 1959; that line is not taken as the dating. This piece's July date follows the conference described in the letter's own account. This edition carries this letter, not the speech record of the conference.