Oral Political Report to the Seventh National Congress

Comrades! On behalf of the Central Committee I am reporting to you. The written text of the political report has already been distributed and you have all seen it, so I will not follow the written text. I will speak only about some of the questions raised in the report, and about some questions that the report does not develop fully. I will take up three questions: the question of the line, several policy questions, and several questions concerning the Party internally.

I. The Question of the Line

What line should our Seventh Congress decide on? What political line? How should it be decided? In our view it should be: “Mobilize the masses boldly and freely, build up the people's strength, and under the leadership of our Party defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people, and establish a new-democratic China.” That is our Party's line, our Party's political line. The mobilization of the masses and the building of the people's strength under the Party's leadership mentioned here means organizing our ranks. What are we organizing our ranks for? For nothing else than to strike down the enemy — Japanese imperialism and its running dogs. And what will be the result once it is defeated? It will be the liberation of the whole country, the liberation of the whole people, and the establishment of a new China — a new-democratic China, an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and strong China. That is our general line.

Has our Party always had such a line? Yes, our Party has always had this line. After the Russian October Revolution the character of the Chinese revolution changed, from an old-democratic into a new-democratic revolution. Especially after the birth of the Chinese Communist Party, in the three periods of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the War of Resistance, were the Chinese people not struggling throughout for a new-democratic China? Precisely so.

Our line, our programme, summed up in a single sentence, is “a revolution of the popular masses against imperialism and feudalism under the leadership of the proletariat.” What is the character of a people's revolution led by the proletariat? It is a revolution of the popular masses against imperialism and feudalism led by the proletariat — that is the new-democratic revolution. Hence our politics is the politics of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution of the popular masses led by the proletariat; our economy is such an economy; our culture is such a culture. Politics, military affairs, economics, culture — every present-day revolutionary task is of this character, and every revolutionary force is of this character. Within this line there is a question of the ranks, a question of the enemy, and a question of the leader and commander of the ranks. The ranks are the popular masses; the enemy is imperialism and the feudal forces; the leader and commander is the proletariat. What does the proletariat lead? It leads the popular masses. And what does it lead the popular masses to do? To fight imperialism and feudalism.

Our programme is just a few words, yet it is often forgotten by some of our comrades. Do they forget the fight against imperialism? Sometimes, but it is not so easily forgotten; it is remembered a little more firmly. The fight against feudalism is sometimes forgotten. Why? Because the peasants are forgotten.

Do we want the peasants, or do we want the landlords? On this question, if you want the landlords you forget the peasants; if you want the peasants you need not entirely forget the landlords. It is fairly easy to want the peasants without forgetting the landlords; it is much harder to want the landlords without forgetting the peasants. By “the popular masses” we mean chiefly the peasants. Was there not a time when we forgot the peasants? We forgot them in 1927, when the peasants stretched out their hands asking for something, and the communists forgot to give it to them. During the War of Resistance a question of almost the same character also existed. Who is to defeat Japanese imperialism? Who is to build the new China? Where does the strength lie? At such moments some people could not make this out, and forgot it.

The largest part of the popular masses is the peasants, next the petty bourgeoisie, and only after that the other democratic elements. The main force of the Chinese democratic revolution is the peasantry. Forget the peasants, and there is no Chinese democratic revolution; without a Chinese democratic revolution there is no Chinese socialist revolution, and no revolution at all. We have read a great many Marxist books, but take care not to forget the two words “the peasants”; if you forget those two words, then reading a million volumes of Marxist books is useless, for you have no strength. Rely on a few petty-bourgeois and liberal-bourgeois elements and you can hold out a little, but without the peasants who will grow the food? With nothing to eat and no soldiers, you cannot hold out even two or three days.

Leadership by the proletariat means leadership by the Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party is the party of the proletariat. Out of the proletariat there emerged a relatively advanced section which organized itself into a political body called the Communist Party. Of course the Party also contains other elements — people of peasant or petty-bourgeois origin, intellectuals from other classes. But origin is one thing and joining the Party is another: though not of proletarian origin, once in the Party one's thinking and conduct must become proletarian. The Communist Party wants revolution, and revolution requires organizing the ranks, chiefly the peasants, together with other classes — the petty bourgeoisie, the liberal bourgeoisie, sometimes even the big bourgeoisie, even landlords. The ranks must have a commander, and in China there are mainly two possible ones: either the proletariat or the big bourgeoisie and big landlords. In Chinese society both ends are small but both are strong; the middle is large but politically weak. The middle strata waver — every middle stratum has its wavering character. Only two classes are resolute: the proletariat and the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. Their political representatives are respectively the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. The liberal bourgeoisie also contends with us for leadership. Do not imagine that the liberal bourgeoisie is tremendously revolutionary, almost the same as the Communist Party. It has its own independent opinions, its own independent political organization — at present the Democratic League. Part of the Democratic League is petty bourgeois, but its main body is liberal bourgeoisie, and it has its own character. Recently the Reference Materials published a statement by Mr. Zhang Lan, chairman of the Democratic League — I do not know whether comrades have seen it — that is his stand, his independent political views. Recently Zuo Shunsheng issued another statement at a reception for foreign correspondents, also with his own independent stand. At present the Democratic League agrees with the Communist Party on the demand for a coalition government; the Kuomintang calls the Democratic League a friendly party of the communists, and we want to unite with it and ally with it. But it has its independent opinions; at present it “fights on both flanks,” distinguishing itself from both sides and waging struggle on two fronts. On the one hand it does not approve of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship; on the other it does not fully agree with the Communist Party either, saying it stands between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. That statement is quite thoroughgoing and correct: it has defined its own character, belonging to the middle-of-the-road school.

In the latter period of the Great Revolution our Party committed errors in carrying out the line of an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution of the popular masses led by the proletariat: at that time it talked only about proletarian leadership while in fact abandoning leadership. Before that, in the long period from 1921 to 1926, the broad ranks of Chinese Communist comrades organized the workers, led the workers' movement, led the student movement; later they pushed the reorganization of the Kuomintang and helped to organize it; finally, in the course of the revolution, they organized vast peasant associations with tens of millions of members, mainly in the southern provinces but also in the north. Was this Marxism? Comrade Lin put it well yesterday: at that time there was Marxism; Marxism came to China, was taken up by the Chinese people, and was put into practice — yet there seemed to be not very much of it, even almost none. That is to say, some people at that time did not understand Marxism; the dominant leadership of our Party then, represented by Chen Duxiu, by the latter period of the Great Revolution had simply abandoned Marxism.

What does abandoning Marxism mean? It means forgetting the leadership of the proletariat, forgetting the popular masses, forgetting the peasants. When the landlords began to howl, they poured cold water on the peasants. They wanted the leadership of the proletariat but not the peasants — do you suppose the leadership of the proletariat still existed? In China, how is Marxism to be practised today? If one does not exercise the leadership of the proletariat, does not want that leading position, then what is there to lead? Proletarian leadership should lead chiefly the peasants; but they did not want the peasants — when the peasants stretched out their hands they poured cold water, because the landlords had stretched out theirs too. The landlords said: Communist Party, you are no good! So the Communist Party was caught between landlords and peasants, and in the end accepted the landlords' influence and poured cold water on the peasants. Fighting imperialism and feudalism without the peasants — what fight against feudalism is that? Without the fight against feudalism, what fight against imperialism? What is imperialism for? It sees grease on China's body and wants to skim some off. Of every five people in China, four are peasants. If you divide 450 million into five parts, each part is 90 million, so four nineties are rural population and only one ninety is urban. Strike at the “imperialists” with five fingers and they say that is too many, no need for so many; cut off four fingers and strike with one — yet with great force, and the “imperialists” panic, howl and cry; and crying is not enough to save face, so they kneel before us. Look: four fingers gone and only one left — the proletariat too is isolated, a commander-in-chief without an army, an air force commander. If you are a commander-in-chief you must have troops. With no peasants, do you think the petty bourgeoisie will come? He peeps into your house, sees hardly anyone there, is frightened and does not come. The petty bourgeoisie is the most changeable: sometimes cock-a-hoop, thumping his chest — “I am number one in the world”; sometimes scared out of his wits. With not a single soldier in your house and nothing to eat, the old gentleman takes one look and deserts. Is that anyone's fault but ours? Not his — the fault lies with us, the commander-in-chief, because we do not recruit. That is the petty-bourgeois temper: he looks at your strength, at your policy. If your strength is great he is eager — “How about me joining? Shall I lead the charge?” Seeing only a few grown-ups in your house, he says: “Next time! I have business today; my wife at home is ill.” Only when the proletariat has recruited soldiers, bought horses and stored grain — when four of the five fingers are there, and of the remaining finger the proletariat occupies half while the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are just the fingernail, the other half being the petty bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie — then, if you say “Coming, comrade? Come to the meeting!”, he will come even if his wife is ill. Seeing such strength, he says: “Nothing wrong at home, food enough to eat, wife quite well.”

We have made mistakes, forgotten leadership, forgotten the peasant masses. As for leadership, you must have something to lead: only where there are the led is there a leader; only where there is being-led does the question of leadership arise. If you do not want the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie runs away, the liberal bourgeoisie runs away too, the big landlords and big bourgeoisie concentrate their forces to strike us, and the proletariat rolls off the stage, its nose smashed. Then it gets up, looks about, and says: “Why do you strike your father? Chiang Kai-shek, are you not a friend?” Then its brain clears and it undertakes the Agrarian Revolution. In the Agrarian Revolution period there came another attack of impetuosity. But still no peasants, no leadership, no greatest force of the Chinese people — four of the five fingers rejected. Why does impetuosity also reject the peasants? Because impetuosity means workers' risings and urban uprisings, great zeal for seizing big cities; the peasants are wanted too, but only incidentally — no attention to studying the peasants, studying his face, his eyes, his size, whether his surname is Zhang or Li, what he is thinking, what food he has. Some people have travelled through many provinces, walked twenty-five thousand li and more, taken part in the Agrarian Revolution for years; yet set them a question — “What is a rich peasant?” — and they say sorry, never studied it. Ask, “What is a middle peasant?” — never studied that either. Even glancing at the flowers from horseback would be something, but they ride by without looking at the flowers, and the flowers are the peasants. Dismounting to look at the flowers is of course more careful — that is called investigation and study. Those afflicted with impetuosity did not want the petty bourgeoisie or the middle bourgeoisie either, and in the end became air force commanders, their ranks growing smaller with every battle. Our Party twice became small: grown big, then small again; grown big, then small again. The first time, of more than fifty thousand Party members few remained; the second time, of three hundred thousand Party members few remained. Proportionally the first loss was smaller: of fifty-odd thousand about ten thousand remained, one fifth; the second time of three hundred thousand fewer than thirty thousand remained — about twenty-five thousand organized members, less than one tenth. Now we have grown big again; the little finger has become a fist. From now on, never let it shrink again.

The base text is the Wikisource version, seventy-five paragraphs. The written report the speech refers to is 'On Coalition Government'; the two must be read together to see the whole; the oral text is short and full of rhetorical questions, markedly different in register from the written report.

Such was our preparation before the outbreak of the War of Resistance. Once it began, our policy was “mobilize the masses boldly and freely, build up the people's strength.” At that time the Central Committee held that only a people's war could defeat Japan. By a people's war we meant, basically or mainly, a peasant war. We have never said that the War of Resistance against Japan, without the participation of the broad masses of peasants, could defeat Japan. It is a hundred and two years since Marxism came into the world: have true Marxists anywhere ever said the enemy could be defeated without the people's struggle? Never. The people's struggle means either relatively peaceful struggle — strikes, ideological struggle, economic struggle, political struggle — or its highest form, which is war. If anyone calls himself a Marxist and says “the enemy can be defeated without the people's struggle,” then at the moment he says it he proclaims that he is not a Marxist at all — his claim to Marxism was false. For some people such thinking is temporary, a temporary wavering — as though the enemy could be defeated without the people's war. Then on whom do they think they can rely? For instance, on the Kuomintang, even on its die-hard section, believing Japan can be defeated by relying on them. But after a time they feel this will not do either. At that period their Marxism was not much; it grew later. In our Party this was common, and such comrades were quite numerous. Our Party held a National Representatives Conference in May 1937, the Luochuan Conference in August, and in November a Party activists' conference in Yan'an. At these conferences the Central Committee affirmed the line: mobilize the masses boldly and freely, build up the people's strength, and under the leadership of our Party defeat Japanese imperialism, liberate the whole of China, and build a new-democratic new China. This line was approved and adopted by these conferences. At these conferences the Central Committee did not believe that an autocratic government waging no people's war could liberate China; this was written in the resolutions and in the documents. Can a despotic government that oppresses the people liberate China? Can victory be won by relying on it? We firmly did not believe it! For if you believe that, Marxism runs away — at least it runs away overnight, for a while. Afterwards you have to go look for it and fetch Marxism back. If you go look for Marxism, it will come back; if you do not look for it, it will not come back, for it does not know whether you want it! We did not believe Japan could be defeated easily and neatly without the strength of the broad masses of the people. In putting the question this way, we were not lowering the proletarian programme to the level of the bourgeois programme, but raising the bourgeois programme to the level of the proletarian programme. This formulation was once rebutted: they said it was not Marxism, that the formulation was about seizing leadership. They said the bourgeois programme, especially the Kuomintang's programme representing the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, had strength; propaganda among the broad masses, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie with this Communist Party stuff was useless!

On this question we should analyse, and propagate our views far and wide, saying: “Peasants! Petty proprietors! Fellow countrymen one and all! Know this: only when you unite yourselves and transform our state system — making it a system with democracy, a people's army, a people's government, people's organizations — can Japanese imperialism be overthrown! Without these, China is a dark China and Japanese imperialism cannot be overthrown! Even if it is overthrown with the help of foreign strength, China remains dark!” Our propagandists should speak precisely such words. To non-Party people we should say, we should propagate: “The people of the whole country must unite, organize a people's army, a people's party, a people's government; the Kuomintang must be transformed, the National Government must be transformed, the Kuomintang's army must be transformed.” Why do we propose transforming them? To raise them to the level of our programme. But if you ask them to rise, they will not rise — what then? Then rely on the people of the whole country, on the growth of progressive forces, on winning over the middle forces, and also on the democratic elements inside the Kuomintang. We once conceived the idea of transforming the Kuomintang, and in this matter we seem to have made an error — that is to say, the estimate was not correct; things could not be done as we then envisaged, and the Kuomintang was not transformed. It should be said there was nothing wrong in wanting to transform it; but it would not listen. Can the Kuomintang be transformed? Perhaps, and perhaps not. To transform it we needed to create certain conditions — to develop progressive forces, win over middle forces, and bring about a split inside the Kuomintang — but there was no time. The progressive forces did not grow that large, the middle forces had not yet been won over, and the democratic elements inside the Kuomintang were throttled by the fascists; so the transformation came to nothing. Did we lose anything by it? Not one copper. When we said “transform it,” we did not mean we would stop developing progressive forces, stop developing the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, stop widespread propaganda — indeed the very propaganda of saying “transform it” was itself a gain. Having heard us, ordinary people would feel the Communist Party's words made sense: the Generalissimo's face was not much to look at, so it should be washed. I am told that at a mass meeting in Xi'an once, with a Three People's Youth Corps man in the chair, many peasants attended; when the meeting ended the platform shouted the slogan “Long live Generalissimo Chiang!” and the peasants shouted “Pay the grain tax promptly!” Why? Because the Kuomintang wanted the peasants at meetings for nothing but grain and taxes — grain and taxes filled their heads, so when the platform shouted, they shouted too. The Kuomintang's face is very black indeed; if we proposed washing it, of the country's four hundred and fifty million people probably four hundred and thirty million would approve. We proposed that the Generalissimo wash his face; he would not wash it. We lost nothing — we made a profit, for the common people learned why he should wash it. Comrades, is our policy today still the same? Do we ask him to wash his face, or do we cut off his head? To this day we still ask him to wash his face; we do not cut off his head. This Congress has not met to decide on cutting off heads! That head must not be cut! We still carry out the “face-washing policy,” asking him to revise his mistaken policies. As for whether he will wash — that remains to be seen. Today he does not wash; will he wash tomorrow? Hard to say. Old people do not like washing their faces — old comrades, do not take offence — and the Generalissimo is very old too. The chances that he will not wash are greater than that he will; perhaps he will give himself a slight rub for appearances, or perhaps not even that, ending in a sweat, in a fine mess!

Comrades! Who are the people, what is the force, that contend with us for leadership within China and would drag China back into a dark world? It is the reactionary clique inside the Kuomintang — the representatives of the big landlords, the big bourgeoisie, the big bankers and the big compradors.

At the Party's Sixth Plenary Session in 1938 we corrected the sort of erroneous thinking described above — the kind that instead of demanding the Kuomintang wash its face declared its face very beautiful while our own was covered with dust, no match for it, at best about equal. “Uphold the National Government at all times, in all matters, in all places” — that was the standard slogan of such erroneous thinking. Such things were wrong.

The Sixth Plenary Session brought the correction, and many comrades understood the question. After the Session some still thought the Kuomintang very fine, very beautiful. Later came the Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties, and then the first anti-Communist high tide. After these two things the false mask the Kuomintang wore in its “official hat opera” came off, its ugly face showed, and some of our comrades gradually woke up. Then came the second anti-Communist high tide — the Southern Anhui Incident — and the third, when in July 1943 they demanded the dissolution of the Communist Party and the abolition of the Border Region. By then the illusions about the Kuomintang within our Party had been largely swept away. The idea was discarded that the Kuomintang needed no transformation and China could still be saved, Japan driven out; changed was the idea that the main reliance was not on ourselves — on developing our own strength, on expanding the liberated areas, on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army growing without restriction; established was the idea of mobilizing the masses boldly, building up the people's strength, defeating the Japanese aggressors under our leadership and building a new China. A new picture unfolded among the broad masses and in comrades' minds. So thought is a strange thing: to remove the bad part of it — the part that does not fit Marxism-Leninism, that does not fit China's conditions — requires a certain stage, requires experience; words alone will not carry it. Lenin said one must “educate the people through experience,” because the people trust experience and not talk. But talk there must still be. We have had two great teachers: the Japanese, and the Generalissimo. These two great teachers give us lessons without pay. Without these two great teachers, the Chinese people could not be educated, nor our Party. As for the little teachers within our Party, who do not know many characters and cannot expound much doctrine — when they speak, people do not listen. Later we engaged a Japanese and a Chinese — one Japanese fascism, one the Generalissimo — and these two teachers, by teaching us, taught us well.

After the Sixth Plenary Session our Party firmly exercised leadership over the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, the middle bourgeoisie, even the landlords. In our liberated areas we carried out rent and interest reduction together with payment of rent and interest, and even the landlords followed us. Because we firmly exercised such leadership we developed the army, the liberated areas and the Party. From then on we defeated innumerable attacks by the Japanese aggressors and gradually opened the offensive — for instance the offensive begun last year, larger still this year. In the early period of the war we were on the offensive, in the middle period on the defensive, and now the offensive is primary and the defensive secondary — as against Japan. As against the Kuomintang, we repulsed its three anti-Communist high tides and innumerable attacks — ideological, political, military — and put the Kuomintang in such a position that its influence declined and its strength shrank. The Kuomintang too engaged a teacher, the same teacher as ours, named Okamura Yasuji; he used to live in Beiping, and now he has moved to the neighbourhood of the Generalissimo. Once this teacher taught them, the Kuomintang's influence declined and its strength shrank. Has the Kuomintang's influence now disappeared? It is still considerable. The Kuomintang has “devoted itself to the national revolution for forty years,” plus twenty more — sixty years of history; we are not yet half that, only twenty-four years. Our influence must go in before theirs will go out; while ours does not go, theirs does not leave. So the Kuomintang's influence has declined but not vanished; its strength has shrunk but is still considerable. They have an army of a million and a half, we only nine hundred and ten thousand; they have international standing, we have none; they have two hundred million people, we have one hundred million; they have sixty years of influence, we only twenty-four.

Because during the War of Resistance our Party's line was correctly carried out — boldly mobilizing the masses, building the people's strength, defeating the enemy under the Party's leadership, building the new China — the anti-Japanese war of the popular masses against imperialism and feudalism led by the proletariat squeezed the Kuomintang into such a position of declining influence and shrinking strength, and placed our Party in the position of being the centre of gravity of the movement to save the nation by resistance; the eyes of the broad people of the whole country are upon us.

It is now completely proved that only this line is the correct line. The line of contending for leadership, of contending for independence and autonomy, is the line of our Party Central Committee; it is the line that reflects the demands of the great majority of comrades in the whole Party and the demands of the great majority of the people of the whole country. Where did this line come from? Did it fall from the sky? No. Was it sent from abroad? No. It grew out of China's own soil. Lu Xun said: roads are made by people walking. Our line too has been trodden out by the Chinese people with their own feet. To contend for leadership, to contend for independence and autonomy — that is the line of the war of resistance of the popular masses led by the proletariat, that is, led by the Communist Party, against Japanese imperialism and its running dogs. Its correctness can now be demonstrated in the fullest, clearest way. It is not the winter of 1937, nor 1938, nor even the period right after the Sixth Plenary Session; yet down to the third anti-Communist high tide there were still some comrades who did not believe this line. And now, has everyone awakened? Does everyone believe it thoroughly? Has everyone shouted “Long live Marxism”? I see all sorts of cases: some are at ten thousand years, some at nine thousand, some at eight thousand... Even among our Party members, the understanding of the million two hundred and ten thousand members is not uniform. Many forum meetings have recently been held in North China and Central China, and they show that not only among non-Party people but even among Party members there are quite a few who do not fully understand, are not fully clear about, such a line of ours. So among our broad membership there is Marxism, but the degrees differ greatly — I should say from one year to nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine years, though some have reached ten thousand.

Our policy toward the Kuomintang is unity as well as struggle. In struggle we are principled: justified, advantageous, restrained. We fight it from a position of self-defence — so we are justified; the struggle is partial — we fight only when it profits us; but the struggle is also temporary — for the sake of unity we exercise restraint. Put the other way round: struggle that is defensive, partial and temporary must serve unity. The Kuomintang thinks of striking us every day, yet dares not make a big rupture with us. Our struggle also has restraint. For example, we sent a letter demanding to send delegates to the San Francisco Conference; the Kuomintang at first refused, yet did we not go in the end? As to our saying three delegates and their saying one — one then, we did not haggle much; our delegate has already reached Washington. Comrades! Rights are won by struggle, not presented as gifts. In this world there is the word “struggle,” and our comrades must not forget it. Someone said our Party's philosophy is a “philosophy of struggle” — so said a commander at Yulin, Deng Baoshan. I said, “You are right.” Ever since there were slave-owners, feudal lords and capitalists, they waged struggle against the oppressed people — the “philosophy of struggle” was invented by them first. The oppressed people's “philosophy of struggle” came later; it took thousands of years of struggle before there was Marxism. To abandon struggle and want unity only, or to neglect struggle and fight half-heartedly, improperly, without vigour — that is an expression of petty-bourgeois weakness. But the petty bourgeoisie has another quality, called revolutionary spirit. They do make revolution, but with a certain weakness. It is now completely proved that weakness is wrong. There was a Zhang Naiqi on whom I pinned a label, “Zhang Naiqi-ism”; I think the label fits. This gentleman has now made peace with us; he told Comrade Zhou Enlai he had made mistakes — that is good. In November 1937 I criticized him at a Party meeting, saying Zhang Naiqi's philosophy was bad, because he then put forward “fewer appeals, more suggestions.” That was an expression of liberal-bourgeois weakness, and his view was defeated by ours. He is a middle-of-the-roader; only by firmly allying with him can we educate him in the long course of experience. The liberal bourgeoisie will keep influencing us with its weakness, for that is its nature — like that “fragrance” given off by Lin Daiyu in Dream of the Red Chamber after her bath, the liberal bourgeoisie gives off a similar “fragrance,” and it is the “fragrance of weakness.” Producing that “fragrance,” it seeks a market in which to sell it, and sends it purposefully to us here in Yan'an, exerting a bad influence on our Party. Our propaganda at times is too grating to the ear: the rose is lovely but its thorns prick — “mutton is tasty but scalding hot.” For those gentlemen, the rose may be lovely, but the thorns are too many, so they are not very fond of it. They like Xue Baochai, not Tanchun. This is troublesome. Comrades! Worse is yet to come — do not fear trouble. To make revolution means trouble, and sometimes very much trouble. If you want to avoid trouble, sit at home and smoke a long pipe. Now summer has come: sit under a tree with a big palm-leaf fan and there is less trouble. But there are still storms. Did not Lu Xun write a piece called “Storm”? There will never be a world without storms; if you fear storms you cannot be a human being — you had better hurry to the King of Hell and settle accounts. Our Party meets storms all the time — big, medium and small. Let us not fear storms. Our will is stronger now, and we shall not be drowned by them. To drown our Party in this sea called China is impossible and will not happen.

On this section, let me add a few words in conclusion.

First, how do the peasants stand? What attitude do they take? Over the past eight years, and over the past twenty-four, the peasants have warmly welcomed our policies, warmly welcomed the policies I have just described. But as a Party, in our leading ideology, we must keep a clear line of demarcation from the peasants and not merge with them. To comrades of peasant origin this may be hard to grasp: “I am a peasant myself — why must I not merge with the peasants?” I say: you are now called a Communist; the peasantry is your origin, and origin and joining the Party are two different things — the Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. This point must be made clear gradually: if one year does not suffice, then two; if two do not, then three. Do not simply read out whatever our Congress says. Yesterday a comrade said: in Dimitrov's book there is the story of a German comrade who, speaking at a meeting of unemployed workers in Berlin, simply read out the resolution of the Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and so the masses did not like listening. Let us not copy the Seventh Congress verbatim either. The Congress says “do not merge with the peasants”; if you go back and say just that, many peasant comrades will object, saying they are peasants. When I say do not merge with the peasants, I mean we must raise the peasants a step higher, raise them to the level of the proletariat. In the coming decades we must raise all peasants outside the Party too to the level of the proletariat. Whoever does not believe this is not a Marxist. In the future we shall have mechanization and collectivization — that is how we shall raise them.

The speech summarises the line as 'the proletarian-led revolutionary struggle of the broad masses of the people against imperialism and feudalism', and breaks it into three things: who is the ranks, who is the enemy, who is the leader and commander of those ranks. This part corresponds directly to the political line adopted by the Seventh Congress.

Second, how about the petty bourgeoisie? Intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin, inside the Party or outside, have their wavering character and also their revolutionary character. Wavering is their bad side, but generally it can be overcome by education. Within the Party, the Yan'an rectification is proof. The artists and writers also approved the method of the Forum on Literature and Art; previously they did not know how to proceed — our Party showed them the direction, carried on educational work with them, not by commandism but by gradually making them conscious, and that has been very effective. To overcome the petty bourgeoisie's wavering, we must rely on constant, appropriate propaganda by our Party, and chiefly on practical deeds — on our own great strength, our vast liberated areas and our armies.

Third, how about the liberal bourgeoisie? It wavers even more, but at present it wants democracy — the democracy it has in mind — and so it is our ally. Under our firm influence the liberal bourgeoisie can be brought to neutrality and even go along with us. For instance, they favour the slogan of a coalition government; again, during the several anti-Communist high tides they took a neutral attitude. When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party fight, they stand between, mediating — telling this side not to do that, and that side not to do this. The clearest case was the People's Political Council convened on 1 March 1941: our councillors would not attend, the Generalissimo insisted we attend, and we insisted we would not. We said: “Give us something, and we shall attend.” They said: “Attend first, then we shall give.” We said: “Give first, then we shall attend.” Back and forth it went — I want you to give, you want me to attend — and in the end one would not give and the other would not attend; the giving was not given, the attending not attended. Meanwhile some middle-of-the-road people pulled at both ends, telling the Kuomintang “do give,” and telling us “do attend.” That is a specimen case of liberal-bourgeois wavering. Such things are legion; time is short and I cannot recount them all. In short, under our firm influence the liberal bourgeoisie can be brought to neutrality and even led to go with us.

Fourth, how about the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie? The stratum of big landlords, big bankers and big compradors, represented by the Kuomintang reactionary clique, are the reactionaries within the domestic anti-Japanese front. Our attitude toward them is like that of the British Communist Party toward Churchill. Yesterday's newspapers carried an article by the General Secretary of the British Communist Party which comrades should read. His slogan is a coalition government with the Liberals, the Labour Party and the Common Wealth Party, and the overthrow of Churchill by the vote at the next general election. His word “overthrow” is liable to be misunderstood in our China, for our conditions differ from foreign ones: with us “overthrow” means contending for leadership. We once “overthrew” once before; we must contend for leadership. Note the word “contend” — the big landlords and big bourgeoisie will move heaven and earth to win leadership, to place the broad masses, chiefly the three hundred and sixty million peasants, under their leadership and out of our influence. Who in China carries the grease? The greasiest of all are the peasants. The Japanese came to scrape the grease off the Chinese peasants; Chiang Kai-shek too scrapes the peasants' grease; and take note that in China's future there will be an old gentleman Scobie coming to scrape grease. In Greece, Scobie is the one who, for Britain, scrapes the grease off the Greek people. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie want to turn China into a dark China; hence they are the object of our long-term struggle.

Finally, a word about foreign countries. What of them? The Soviet Union is without question a friend, the best friend of the Chinese people — I said so clearly in the report. The other countries, the big powers, the allied nations, must also be firmly united with; but where they act wrongly, we must fight a little too. Why has this not appeared in the Liberation Daily? Not printed is not the same as never to be printed; it is not a denial that we should fight a little. If they want to produce a Scobie, that will not do. I gave a reminder of this meaning in the report. Abroad there are still reactionary forces, and they are still very strong. The international situation as a whole is now good — the unity of the anti-fascist front with the Soviet Union in it, above all the unity of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. This unity is the main thing; it governs everything. The face of the world has completely changed — I have written much and fully about that aspect in the report. About the dark side I wrote little. Those foreigners who prop up Chiang Kai-shek do not have pleasant faces either; some put on the airs of a heavenly official bestowing blessings, but they are not pleasant to look at, and we must be alert.

That is the first question, which may be called the situation and the line.

II. Several Policy Questions

There are policies for every field, and the programme has a general programme and a concrete programme.

First question: the general programme and the concrete programme. Was such a division begun only this time? There was such a division before, only previously we never wrote them apart in the same place: the first item the general programme, the second the concrete programme. Take the pamphlet On New Democracy — it spoke of no concrete policies, only of the general programme. But every period of ours has had concrete policies: for instance the Ten-Point Programme of the early war period, the concrete policies in every field in the middle period of the war, the Twenty-One Point Programme of Administration in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, and programmes more or less similar in all the other anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines — the same in character, slightly different in provisions. In the civil-war period, the Ten-Point Programme adopted by the Party's Sixth Congress was the concrete programme under the general line of new democracy; more concrete still were the Land Law, the Marriage Law, the regulations on political work and so forth. The Northern Expedition period had similar things too — the Party issued many declarations on the current situation, all concrete programmes. This time we clarify the matter here so that our comrades understand: new democracy is our general outline, with outline and details — the “outline” is the big rope of the fishing net held in the hand, the “details” are the eyes of the net.

Second question: about Sun Yat-sen. In my report I said several good words about him. This gentleman Sun Yat-sen must be spoken of in the round. We are Marxists and we speak the dialectics of history. Sun Yat-sen did indeed do some good deeds and say some good words; in my report I tried to bring out these good things. These we should grasp and never let go — even when we die we must hand them on to our sons and grandsons. But there is still a difference between us and Sun Yat-sen: his Three People's Principles fall short of our new democracy; new democracy is indeed more progressive, more developed, more complete than the Three People's Principles. And today's new democracy will in the future develop more completely still. Inside our Party there is a mood that dislikes Sun Yat-sen; this mood exists among a considerable section of the members. To speak frankly, this mood is not quite healthy — an expression of not yet being truly awakened. It reflects the mood of the civil-war period, when, because circumstances were different, even Sun Yat-sen was discarded. Why did we not much speak of Sun Yat-sen then? Because the Kuomintang had knocked us flat at one blow, and when we got up our eyes were red with anger. Chiang Kai-shek, waving Sun Yat-sen's banner, was killing people everywhere; at such a time the masses too disliked Sun Yat-sen. In the ten years of civil war dropping Sun Yat-sen is understandable — our strength was very small. In the early period of the war our strength was still small, so our invoking Sun Yat-sen had little effect, for people still looked down on us. The greater our strength becomes, the more we should invoke Sun Yat-sen — the more benefit and no harm. We should have a clear head in raising the banner of Sun Yat-sen.

Third question: about capitalism. In my report the question of capitalism has been elaborated, affirmed fairly fully. What is the good of that? There is good in it. I affirmed it under this condition: capitalism of the kind Sun Yat-sen called that which “cannot manipulate the livelihood of the nation.” As for the big landlords, big bankers and big compradors who do manipulate the national livelihood, they are not included. When the concrete programme was being drafted, someone proposed adding an item: “confiscate the property of the big landlords, big bankers and big compradors.” Actually the general text, quoting Sun Yat-sen's words that “enterprises, whether Chinese or foreign, which are of a monopolistic character or too large in scale for private resources to manage, such as banks, railways and shipping, shall be operated and managed by the state,” already contains the idea. To speak of confiscation now would mean confiscating the property of the three houses of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung, and that would not be quite right. So I did not say their property should be confiscated, but the idea was stated all the same, for it was Sun Yat-sen who had said it. Later on I shall speak of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution, and they are precisely the target of that revolution, for they are not the bourgeoisie in general. By the bourgeoisie in general I mean the middle bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie — the small and middle bourgeoisie. The special bourgeoisie Sun Yat-sen spoke of, which “manipulates the livelihood of the nation,” is not included. In the future, under our new democracy, in the big cities we shall also confiscate property that manipulates the national livelihood, and confiscate the property of traitors (a point I have already made in the report). We confiscate such property to state ownership under these conditions. Further below I also speak of extensively developing the co-operative economy and the state economy — these two are permitted extensive development.

Our affirmation that capitalism should be extensively developed in this way brings only good and no harm. On this question some in our Party remained unclear for quite a long time; a Narodnik mentality existed. Such thinking will exist for a long time in a party in which members of peasant origin are the majority. By Narodism I mean going straight from a feudal economy to a socialist economy without passing through the stage of developing capitalism. So it was with the Russian Narodniki. Lenin's and Stalin's party criticized them at the time. In the end they became the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. They were “Left” to desperation, wanting socialism all the faster and no development of capitalism. The result? They became counter-revolutionary. The Bolsheviks were not like that. They affirmed that Russia should develop capitalism, holding this advantageous to the proletariat. Lenin said in Two Tactics: “The bourgeois-democratic revolution is less advantageous to the bourgeoisie than to the proletariat.” We must not fear developing capitalism. Even after the victory of the October Revolution, Russia for a time allowed capitalism to exist as a sector of the economy — and a very large one, nearly fifty per cent of the whole social economy. At that time grain came mainly from the rich peasants; not until the Second Five-Year Plan were the small and middle capitalists of the cities and the rich peasants of the countryside eliminated. Our comrades are in a great hurry to eliminate capitalism. Those others, after their socialist revolution triumphed, still went through the period of the New Economic Policy, then the First Five-Year Plan; only at the Second Five-Year Plan, when the collective farms had developed and grain no longer came mainly from the rich peasants, did they put forward the elimination of the rich peasants. Our comrades, in this respect, are far too impatient.

The second part of the speech is several policy questions; the third is several questions within the Party, on how to treat comrades who have erred, the relation of majority and minority, and cadre policy. Thus the book takes shape with both a written and an oral report coexisting.

Fourth question: about communism. This question is mentioned in my report but not emphasized. Why not emphasize it? To emphasize it would mean setting out a communist programme, and we think it better not to set one out at present, for a communist programme means abolishing private ownership and abolishing classes. To write these things in would have one small advantage — it would help educate Party members, for many of our comrades do not yet know what communism is. In the old days on Jinggangshan, when we were confiscating local tyrants' property, I went into one tyrant's house to see whether there were any books; an old woman came out and asked what I had come for. I said I had come to look for things. She said: “The property was already shared out yesterday — everything has been communized, there is nothing left to communize.” Many of our peasant comrades think that handing a landlord's property over to them is communism. That of course is wrong.

Some say our Party would do well to change its name: they say our programme is excellent but our name is bad — “your aim, sir, is great indeed, but your title will not do.” Not only did the Generalissimo cable us demanding a change of name; middle-of-the-road people also urged it. Zuo Shunsheng, for instance, said: “Your programme is truly excellent — if only you were not called the Communist Party, I would join.” During the anti-Communist high tide of July, August and September the year before last, many of our documents went out; on reading them they were highly pleased — a fine programme, only the name is bad. Many Americans also want us to change our name; if we did, they would be pleased. They would like us to change it to Kuomintang — probably no name in the world is finer than Kuomintang. There is also a “Third Party,” but it is only third, that is all. Or one might call ourselves the Conservative Party. But the whole thing does not rest on the name: call yourself Conservative or whatever, they will still call you the Reds. The American journalist Forman wrote a book called Report from Red China. Another American correspondent, Snow, wrote a book called Red Star Over China, now translated as Journey to the West. Change the name however you like — it is red all the same. You may whiten yourself with powder, renouncing rouge for face-powder only, but they will still hang the red account on you. So the name does not matter. “Kuomintang” is a fine name surely — yet why do people dislike the Kuomintang so? In the old days, fearing a child might fall ill or die, people would deliberately give it a bad name — Cat, Dog. History has one Wang Zhen'e — such a pleasant-sounding name — and he died all the same. Are we to give the Party a name that will keep it from dying? Whatever name you invent, so long as what it does remains the same, the reality will not change. There was a correspondent named Abend, with something of a liberal tinge, an old democrat of the old school. He called us “moderate democratic centralism” — you see we are not so very “red.” If even representatives of the bourgeoisie talk like that, then our Party's name need not be changed. Our name is liked by the Chinese people.

Fifth question: about the Kuomintang. We criticize the Kuomintang sharply, but also quite objectively, not going beyond its reality. If it has any merit at all, we enter it on its account. Unfortunately the Kuomintang's merits are few; we should like to enter them, but it is hard — only a few entries, and with a tail attached: the Generalissimo must wash the black stuff off his face. That is our policy. On the one hand sharp criticism; on the other, leaving room. Thus negotiation and co-operation remain possible, and we hope they will change their policies. Have we ever said “Down with the Generalissimo”? No. In my report the Generalissimo is not even mentioned once. This Generalissimo wrote a “very fine” book called China's Destiny, which deserved a mention — yet he went unmentioned, which is truly a pity. Among the dead, my report names Sun Yat-sen, and now Roosevelt is added; among the living, the revolutionary is Stalin, the counter-revolutionary Hitler; as for the rest, the less said the better. So we leave the Kuomintang room, and shall not commit errors; without leaving room there is only one practical conclusion — “down with” — and then we should commit a political error. The Generalissimo has seen this point too: several times he tried to goad us into committing such an error, goading our armies to march out and strike at Xi'an, goading us to demand the overthrow of the Kuomintang. Comrades! We must watch for such things, watch for such provocations. You say you want co-operation — very good; but you must wash your face before we “marry” you; if you will not wash your face it does not look well, and we shall not “marry” you. That is our policy.

On self-defence and counter-attack. We must counter-attack the Kuomintang's attacks from a position of self-defence — self-defence, and counter-attack. Every attack, great or small, that the Kuomintang makes must be answered, must be countered — in words or in arms, especially in arms: whenever it attacks, wipe it out clean. We have said: resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly and wholly eliminate it. I told the Kuomintang liaison officers the same. Our policy has three articles. The first is the philosophy of Laozi: “do not presume to be first in the world” — that is, we do not fire the first shot. The second is what the Zuo Commentary calls “retreating three she”: you come, and we about-turn and march — one she is thirty li, three she is ninety li; though not necessarily, depending on the size of the ground. By “retreating three she” we mean: you come, and we give way. The third is from the Book of Rites: “courtesy demands reciprocity.” Not to return a visit is discourteous; not to be visited is also discourteous — that is, “we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.” We put forward this slogan as early as 1939, and it is still our policy. Suppose we have a hundred guns and you seize ninety-nine: we are of course displeased, but we do not blame you — your skill is great, you are very clever. But with even one gun left, we shall fight to the end. So long as one gun remains in our hands, if we are struck down we pass the gun to our sons, and our sons to their grandsons. There is the story of the Foolish Old Man who moved the mountains: in Shanxi there were once Mount Taihang and Mount Wangwu — they are lower now, but once they were higher and the roads were not easy. There was a man called the Foolish Old Man, a very simple old fellow, and near him lived another old man called the Wise Old Man, a very clever one. One day the two quarrelled. Why? Because the Foolish Old Man wanted to move Mount Taihang and Mount Wangwu away, digging and carrying earth with his sons and grandsons. The Wise Old Man told him there was no need to dig: mountains so high, how could they be dug away? The Foolish Old Man said: though these mountains are high, when I die there are my sons; when my sons die there are my sons' sons; when they die, their sons' sons — father to son, son to grandson, grandsons and sons without end, while the mountains will grow no higher. Later a god was moved by the Foolish Old Man's spirit and reported it to the Lord on High, who sent men to carry the mountains away! This story is from a book, not my invention.

The counter-revolutionaries of this world — the Japanese aggressors and the Chinese reactionaries — must be struck down; it will not do to leave them standing. We counter-attack the Kuomintang's attacks from a position of self-defence. To go beyond that position is to commit errors. But some comrades, once their blood is up, forget this — that is bad. The basis is the position of self-defence; with that position one does not commit errors. Self-defence means being justified; partial means being advantageous; temporary means being restrained — that is justified, advantageous, restrained. To violate this policy is to commit errors. Troubles are many, and our troubles with the Kuomintang are very many indeed.

Sixth question: about transforming the old armies. Transforming old officers, making use of old officers — there is a question of thinking here, requiring wide propaganda throughout the whole Party. Old armies are legion, and many of their officers need transforming; they cannot be dealt with case by case — we need a policy for the whole. Except for the out-and-out reactionaries, who cannot be transformed, the greater part can be. We made mistakes on this question before, not believing old officers could be transformed, holding that old officers were difficult to handle, that they had no Marxism-Leninism and could not become Bolsheviks. In fact, in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society like China, many old officers were merely hoodwinked, looking for a meal and a way out; only with us is there a way out, and we are not afraid they will rebel. The thing most feared in this world is rebellion — yet even rebellion is not fearsome. There are two kinds: open rebellion, and secret rebellion — running secret agents. Open rebellion we are prepared for; it has been going on for years and has produced nothing. Secret agent work we must guard against: harbour no thought of harming others, but never cease to guard against harm from others. We keep our eyes on them — that is what seriousness and vigilance mean. The other case is leaving: if he takes a gun away we lose nothing, for the gun was brought by him and carried off by him. If you want to go, we give you a few banknotes and a farewell meeting, and tell you that you may come back later — that is called politics. Toward the comparatively progressive armies we should give appropriate help; we have helped such armies before. There are two extreme ideas: one is to reject all old armies outright, distrusting them and even seizing their guns — that is bad. The other is to give everything to the comparatively progressive armies — that is helping in a way that harms, and it too is bad. In transforming the old armies we must wage struggle on two fronts.

Seventh question: about our own army. The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the Shanxi New Army and the rest likewise carry out the policy of the united front — internally and externally, the policy of the united front — that is what alliance means. The Red Army of the civil-war period was also an alliance: an alliance of workers and peasants, of Party and non-Party. There is not one of our armies that is not of this kind. Our army does not, like the Kuomintang's army, require everyone to join the Party. We have spoken of a “Party army,” but that means the Party's leadership, not that everyone in the army must be a Party member. Throughout, Party members in our army have at most been one half, usually one third to one fifth — Party members are the minority. In the army the minority of Communists should co-operate with the majority of non-Party people — by “people” I mean peasants, workers, intellectuals. Our army is the army of the popular masses; it belongs to the popular masses and serves the popular masses — this is government of the people, by the people, for the people; it is the army of the new Three People's Principles, that is, of new democracy; it is the people's army against imperialism and feudalism under the leadership of the Communist Party. This army is under the leadership of the proletariat. Some, on hearing that the proletariat leads them, are displeased. Others insist on shouting that you must accept their leadership, and that without their leadership you are incorrect and the line is in question. Such airs are bad, and people do not welcome them. Here we must make clear the nature of leadership. What is leadership? It is embodied in policy, in work, in action; leadership must be exercised in fact, not shouted about every day. Constant shouting of “leadership” is unwelcome, so say less of it. Understand the nature of leadership; do not chant it daily like a sutra.

Now our army is extending co-operation with non-Party people as far as possible. Recently in Shandong three puppet-army units came over; they are no longer called puppet troops but Eighth Route Army. We held meetings with them to straighten out their thinking and remould their ideas; at first they were afraid, then gradually their mental scruples dissolved and they felt quite at ease. This method is a good one, and the Liberation Daily published an editorial on it. If the delegates to this Congress think the method good, let a decision be made and all act accordingly. So long as they do not oppose the revolution, we co-operate with them, keeping one small eye on secret-agent activity. Co-operating with democratic elements — what is there to fear? When there is food we all eat; when there is an enemy we all fight. There is no regular pay: with our own hands we work, with food and clothing in plenty; we also observe the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention, and after all the to-and-fro the thing comes right in the end. Like Liangshan Marsh, which carried out just this policy: their internal political work was quite good — of course there were defects, for among them were big landlords and local tyrants, and no rectification was carried out. That Lu Junyi was driven up the mountain of Liangshan — hauled up by commandism, not of his own will.

Toward all who are not resolute reactionaries but are willing to make revolution and co-operate with us we close the door to none — “Jiang Taigong fishing: the willing take the hook.” Jiang Taigong issued his declaration: if you will come, come; if you will not, so be it. People understood it perfectly. If even a fisherman can issue a declaration, we can issue one too.

Eighth question: expanding the liberated areas. Wherever attack is possible, launch the offensive. But we must attend to defence against the enemy's attacks; if the enemy attacks, we crush him. The offensive should be primary and the defensive secondary.

In the early period of the war we were on the offensive, developing everywhere. In the middle period, 1941 to 1942, we contracted, on the defensive mainly. In 1943 and 1944 we developed forward again. From the experience of these two years we have laid down two rules: the first is the offensive, the second the defensive. Do not, because of the losses of 1941 and 1942, fear the rope once bitten by the snake. On the experience of 1943 and 1944, especially 1944, our task demands developing the offensive, expanding the liberated areas, concentrating larger forces (five or six regiments) and smaller forces (work-and-combat teams), and mounting offensives in the rear of the enemy's rear. For the Japanese position has changed: their troops are worn out and fully occupied with themselves, while our areas have expanded. Conditions on both sides have changed, and the world's too — Berlin is about to fall — so we should concentrate considerable forces and, where conditions permit, attack the enemy's weakest points. This greatly benefits our defence also. The plans for the 1945 tasks now being drawn up in the various places take the offensive as the first item and the defensive as the second. This is not adventurism, for we speak of attacking where conditions permit, not where they do not; and we have also said the enemy may well attack us, and attention must be paid to consolidating the base areas. So this is not adventurism.

Ninth question: preparing the change — from dispersed guerrilla warfare gradually to regular mobile warfare, from guerrilla warfare as the main form gradually to mobile warfare as the main form. We raised this in the early period of the war, but then it was only a hope. What was the task then? Some comrades were never clear on this. Then our enemy in front was the Japanese, and behind us were the reactionaries in the Kuomintang — we were caught between. Our strength then was a little finger. In 1936 our forces in the whole country, including the southern guerrillas, were only thirty thousand; by 1937 they had grown a little, but not much. Our task then was to add strength, to grow: add one finger, then another, then another, and grow. How to grow? By fighting sparrow warfare, guerrilla warfare. Sparrows fill the sky, flying wherever there is something to eat. At the Sixth Plenary Session we listed on purpose eighteen advantages of guerrilla warfare; the method is a good one, and eight years have proved it. The sky-filling sparrows are seed — they can sprout in many places. With this seed, the Party was built, the political power was built, the base areas established, the people won, food found, and cadres tempered. All the while we flew everywhere, the Japanese in front hounding us and the Kuomintang reactionaries behind hounding us, both of them egging us on — egging us on to do what? To concentrate our forces and fight big battles. One drummed for us and the other jeered: one called the Communist Party heroic, a national hero of the anti-Japanese war; the other cursed us as opportunists, cowards. Who wants to be an opportunist? Who does not want to be a national hero? But we had to go on learning from the sparrow. The sparrow may be an opportunist, flying wherever the grain is; the sparrow may still be small — but assembled, they number nine hundred and ten thousand. Are we to remain sparrows for ever, “long live the sparrow”? Objective fact has fully proved that our sparrow is unlike other sparrows: it can grow into the roc. The old Chinese myth tells of a great roc that flew from the northern sea to the southern sea, and with one sweep of its wings all but swept over China. We too prepare for that: we prepare to grow to three million, five million. The process is from small sparrow to big sparrow, to a great roc whose one sweep of wing can cover all China.

We must now “seek out the enemy and seek out the grain.” The enemy has many strongpoints, but the enemy holds only points, lines and small patches. The enemy holds points and lines; we disperse and hold the areas — that is “seeking out the enemy.” People must eat: massed together there is not enough food, so we disperse to eat — that is “seeking out the grain.” In the civil-war period we went in for regularization precisely because we forgot that people must eat, that roads are walked with feet, that bullets kill. The army did not produce and lived entirely off the peasants; after a few months, after a year, the grain was eaten up and there was nothing for it but to about-turn and march — a Long March of ten thousand li, “heroes and men of mettle” indeed. Now we must concentrate larger forces, use our greater numbers to beat their fewer, and strike at the enemy's weak points. You have a hundred men, we have a thousand, and a thousand can annihilate your hundred. Besides, we must turn toward regularization. The report contains this line: the day we obtain new-style weapons we shall be more invincible still, able to defeat Japanese imperialism finally. That contains the meaning of preparing the change. Among the tasks of the liberated areas I spoke of the offensive as primary and the defensive as secondary — that is, the offensive should come first and the defensive after. We must make this preparation: the day we get new-style weapons, it would be bad to be unprepared. Conditions have changed, and our policy must change too — we must have a Marxism that is complete and thorough. In our history there have been many Marxisms: a fragrant Marxism and a stinking Marxism, a living Marxism and a dead Marxism — piled together they are very numerous. What we want is the fragrant Marxism, not the stinking; the living Marxism, not the dead. We must prepare well, from small sparrow to great roc, one sweep of wing across all China, and send Japanese imperialism packing.

There must be a change, but do not expect everything to change overnight. It depends on circumstances: where there is strength, storm the fortresses, take the big cities. If the fortress can be breached and there is food, we storm it; if it cannot be breached and there is no food, we about-turn and disperse the forces — “a deaf man letting off firecrackers: all scattered.” And there is a question argued for over a decade: from countryside to city, or from city to countryside? The dispute has been a muddle. The correct line is to work the countryside first, to study rural conditions. All agree this is the correct line, that it is Marxism. But Marxists walk, and where the road becomes impassable they turn, for there is no getting through. Of course, to keep walking the countryside for ever — a few million years — that is not Marxism but anti-Marxism. True Marxism is this: when the countryside is needed, be in the countryside; when the turn to the cities is needed, turn to the cities. Now, to defeat Japanese imperialism finally, we must turn to the cities with great force — prepare to seize the big cities, prepare to work there, to take over the big railways, factories and banks. Those places hold millions of people — Beiping one or two million, and Baoding, Tianjin and Shijiazhuang also many. To shift the centre of gravity to the cities we must prepare very well. Do not, thinking of the cities, forget the countryside — do not say, “If you assign me rural work I refuse; if you do not give me urban work your cadre policy is wrong.” You go to the city and he goes to the city, but the cities have not so many houses, and no one goes to the countryside — can that work? That is why in the report I call on large numbers of intellectuals to go down to the villages, not in student dress but in coarse cloth. But when we take the big cities — three or five great central cities like Beiping and Tianjin — our Eighth Route Army will enter them. We must certainly hold the Eighth Congress there. Some say that is opportunism; on the contrary — if the Eighth Congress were still held in Yan'an, that would be close to opportunism.

Urban work must be raised to a position as important as base-area work — not merely talked about but actually done: cadres must be sent, thinking must change. When the Seventh Congress ends, cadres must be sent out batch by batch, going batch by batch where conditions permit. To do secret work in the cities, do not be like the heroes of the Water Margin — “unchanging in name on the road, unchanging in surname at rest” — but change your name and surname. Liangshan Marsh did urban work too: the “Magic Traveller” Dai Zong did urban work. Without secret work inside, Zhu Family Village could not have been taken; if there is no wavering within, no trouble within, the problem is hard to solve.

Because the method of fighting changes from guerrilla to regular warfare, and the centre of work shifts from countryside to city, we must also expect differences of opinion over this change. On this question, I should say differences of opinion will certainly arise, more or less: if we prepare well, they may be fewer; if badly, more. The Central Committee should be prepared, and every locality should be prepared — minds must be clear in advance, above all the minds of the high-ranking cadres; then the differences may be somewhat reduced.

Tenth question: the army and the localities. Go deep into the villages, win over the areas under Kuomintang rule, win over the enemy-occupied areas. We are to take the big cities, but our banner is not yet planted in Beiping or Wuhan — it is still planted on the mountains: Qingliang Mountain, Taihang Mountain, Wutai Mountain and the rest. Our present base areas are the springboard of strategy, but the population we now hold is too small: we must grow to half the country's four hundred and fifty million. If we grow to two hundred million, things will be easier. We now have an army of a million, but it is dispersed; it is impossible to concentrate a hundred thousand in any one place. First because there is no food, and no aircraft or heavy artillery. To concentrate tens of thousands of infantry from the Wutai and Taihang forces, from Shanxi-Suiyuan and Shandong, and assault Beiping with rifles — it will not do. A single Ji'an was assaulted eight times without falling; a single Ganzhou seven times without falling. The reason was neither lack of zeal nor Marxism-Leninism failing to work: it was that we had too little with which to attack a city — climb as we might, we could not climb up. If in the future we have weapons to equip an army of one or two hundred thousand, we shall be able to concentrate, breach Shijiazhuang, Baoding and Beiping, taking them from the Japanese, fighting on and on without retreat — or retreating a day or two and advancing again. With one or two hundred thousand troops equipped, conditions are different and our strength no longer small. In the future it will be “weapons plus numbers”: with an army of several million, the whole country is in our hands. An army of three to five million will be needed, so that the whole of China may be won and there be peace under heaven — an independent, democratic, free, united, prosperous and strong China. When necessary we can raise an army of several millions without too heavy a burden on the people — but we must have weapons. Under present circumstances, expanding the army must not add to the people's burden. We shall expand the army wherever conditions permit; but if we expand everywhere with abandon, and after a month or two there is no more millet or rice and the people cry out — that is wrong. To expand where conditions permit means not adding to the people's burden.

Eleventh question: convening the Conference of the People's Representatives of the Chinese Liberated Areas. To convene such a conference is a proposal of our Congress to the people of all the liberated areas — a major matter. It has not yet been announced in the newspapers. For the present only a conference of representatives can be convened; the representatives are not universally elected but chosen by the army, the government and the mass organizations — simpler this way. A people's congress proper requires checking ages, voting rights and so on; universal suffrage is better left until after the war is over. Of course it could be done now — there is already universal suffrage in the liberated areas — but this time we want speed; we cannot be too slow. Once the decision to convene is taken, we must be ready, after the conference opens, to issue a declaration, pass resolutions, and set up a permanent leading body — not called a government but the “Federation of the Liberated People of China.” This is our draft, our conception in mind; the newspapers do not print it now, and it is not written down — only spoken here. The conference is to pass resolutions, issue a declaration, and telegraph the Generalissimo asking him to organize a coalition government. Comrades! My political report is called On Coalition Government, yet today I have said little on this; let me say it here. Have we asked the Generalissimo to organize a coalition government? We have asked many times. A few days ago Comrade Zhou Enlai went to ask; do not our Liberation Daily and the New China News Agency ask once every few days? Each time we ask, he shakes his head, rather displeased. He says organizing a coalition government means “overthrowing the government.” How is organizing a coalition government overthrowing the government? We say we want to unite with him; he says it is to overthrow his government. We propose a conference of the parties; he calls it a “conference to divide the spoils” — as if his government were spoils he will not have divided. Comrade Zhou Enlai said to Chiang Kai-shek: “Dr. Sun Yat-sen said that in the future a National Assembly is to be convened.” He retorted: “You treat my government as the government of the northern warlords — you are the Generalissimos yourselves!” That gentleman is truly hard to reason with, with a streak of hooligan temper — rather bad.

At our conference of the people's representatives of the liberated areas, non-Party people must form the majority. We are to elect a body — think, all of you, what name it should bear; perhaps you will think of a good one. The name now drafted is the “Federation of the Liberated People of China.” The Kuomintang has a government, and to avoid standing in opposition we call it the “Federation of the Liberated People of China.” To liberate the Chinese people — who dares say no liberation is wanted? The people all have the right of resistance to Japan and must strive for that right; that the reactionaries should interfere with progress and abolish the people's right to resist Japan is absolutely impermissible. Raise such a matter and some will curse us for “playing the king and the tyrant.” Play it we do — the king of liberation, the tyrant of liberation. Who dares say we shall not liberate!

III. Several Questions Concerning the Party Internally

First question: about individuality and Party spirit. This question was raised during the rectification, and outsiders have also said things about us. A correspondent wrote an article in the Ta Kung Pao saying the Communist Party wants to abolish individuality and keep only Party spirit — that many of its documents speak only of Party spirit, that decisions on strengthening Party spirit were made, and so on. This view is incorrect. I said in the report: China is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country; imperialism and the feudal forces mutilate individuality, so that the Chinese people cannot develop their intelligence and talents, cannot develop their bodies, cannot develop their spirit — all is stunted. I once said: Lu Xun's bones were very hard; in a semi-colonial country, bones as hard as Lu Xun's are precious. A semi-colonial country is desperately poor; the people's life is bitter, they suffer oppression, and so some become the slaves of foreigners — the compradors. In Shanghai there was the so-called “foreign ham”: a foreigner's kick, counted as a “ham” bestowed. Those who have been to Shanghai have also seen the signs in some parks: “Chinese and dogs not admitted.” The national war is directed against these things: it will not do for a foreign nation to oppress the Chinese nation — we want independence. That brutal foreign fascism should oppress the Chinese people without reason — that will not do! The Chinese Communist Party represents the demand of the whole people for independence! Without independence China has no individuality; national liberation is the liberation of individuality. Politically this must be done, economically this must be done, culturally too. Without a clear, awakened, democratic, independent consciousness among the broad masses, they will not be respected. As for our Party internally, is there a difference here? There is. The Party, as an army, has many characteristics distinguishing it from the people's other armies: it is the advanced detachment, an organized advanced detachment, more organized than other bodies, more tightly knit, more united, all striving toward one goal. An army must have unified discipline and obey commands: attention, at ease, eyes left, eyes right, forward march, take aim, fire. Otherwise, with the enemy in front, one firing east and one firing west, the army will be destroyed by the enemy. The Party as an army is the same: without unified discipline, without democratic centralism — without democracy, or without centralization — nothing works. To be like the autocracy of an emperor in feudal society will not do; that belongs to the feudal age. We practise the democracy of the revolutionary people, different from bourgeois democracy, from the old democracy — a broader democracy. The Party is the union of the finest elements of the people; all willingly accept restraint — accepting the Party's programme and constitution, obeying the Party's resolutions, willing to sacrifice themselves. Hence some people cannot join our Party: they will not be moved about; whether they do this work or that, go east or go west, is all up to them. But the Party member must obey the organization and obey the Party's decisions.

Is our Party now united? The resolution on historical questions speaks of unprecedented unity — meaning more united than before, not that the Party is completely united. One comrade says: “Lay the thing down and there is no problem; pick it up and the problems are many.” There is truth in that. For our Party grew forty or fifty times over during the war of resistance — in 1936 the organized membership was just over twenty thousand; now it tops a million. In so large a party differences of opinion of every kind are inevitable, and so we undertook a work: the rectification movement. It is a movement pushing the Party forward; without rectification the Party could not have advanced. Differences then reached such a point that a certain Wang Shiwei in Yan'an wrote an essay called Wild Lilies which many liked to read. In the spring of 1942, during the rectification at the Central Research Institute, a wall newspaper appeared; it was so popular that people from Qiao'ergou and outside the South Gate flocked to read it — it drew even me for a look. At the time many of the cultured could never mix with the workers, peasants and soldiers; they said the Border Region had no “Han Jingzhou.” We said the Border Region did have Han Jingzhou — who? Wu Manyou, Zhao Zhankui and Zhang Zhiguo. The story may be told. In the Tang dynasty there was a man surnamed Han who served as prefect in Jingzhou, so people called him Han of Jingzhou. Later there was a man who could write, named Li Bai, who wanted office; he wrote a letter to Han of Jingzhou praising him sky-high, first under heaven — really he wanted an interview, and the flattery was to get Han of Jingzhou to give him a post. Thus arose the allusion “Han of Jingzhou.” At that time many in Yan'an were looking for “Han of Jingzhou” but looked in the wrong direction — they found a Han of Jingzhou who dealt in rouge and powder, a petty-bourgeois Han of Jingzhou: the Kritikov of The Front. They could not find where Han of Jingzhou was — but Han of Jingzhou is everywhere: he is the workers, peasants and soldiers. The Han of Jingzhou of the workers is Zhao Zhankui; of the peasants, Wu Manyou; of the soldiers, Zhang Zhiguo. The broad membership has still not clearly grasped this. In short, without rectification the Party cannot advance. The second work we did was to solve the problem of production; without production the Party could not advance either. At the time we had nothing to eat. Wang Shiwei incited the orderlies against us, seeming to speak from the orderlies' standpoint against so-called “three grades and nine ranks” and the small kitchens — though the big kitchens had little to eat, and in fact the small kitchens had not much either. Later we solved this by developing production. In 1941 the Border Region required two hundred thousand shi of public grain from the people, plus transport of public salt — the burden was heavy, and they howled. That year, while the Border Region government was meeting, thunder crashed and County Head Li was struck dead; someone said, ah, why did the God of Thunder not strike Mao Zedong dead? I investigated, and the reason was only one: too much public grain was levied, and some of the people were unhappy. It was true that too much was levied then. Should we not have examined ourselves and studied the policy? Yes! From the Party's birth in 1921 to the higher cadres' conference in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region in 1942, we had still not learned economic work. Not learned it — then learn! Otherwise the God of Thunder will strike people dead. At that time, of our comrades — whether veterans of the Long March of ten thousand li or of a thousand li, old communists or the young people who came to Yan'an during the war — what was the attitude of the Yan'an people toward us? I say it was “respecting the spirits but keeping at a distance.” Why? They felt that though the Communist Party was fine, and they respected it, it added to their burdens, so they kept a little clear of it. Not until last spring, when Comrade Zhao Yimin led the yangge troupe organized by Yangjialing to Ansai — where a conference of labour heroes was meeting and the local people had organized their own yangge troupe — and the two troupes danced together, did I say: from now on all is well under heaven! For the intellectuals from outside were dancing the yangge with the people of northern Shaanxi. Before, the people had respected them and kept at a distance; now they were fused into one. And there were a woman intellectual working at the Yangjiawan school and an intellectual doctor working on Qingliang Mountain — both got on very well with the people. In all our base areas there are such Communists: wherever they go they fuse with the people of the place, “giving their all, till their hearts cease beating” for the common folk. So without these two links — rectification and production — the wheel of revolution could not roll forward, and the Party could not advance! For a time one third of the Liberation Daily's staff were in hospital; Comrade Zhou Yang told me too that the students of the Lu Xun Academy, hardly raising their heads in the morning, would nod off. Why? Nothing to eat. If we solve these two problems, rectification and production, our cause will advance. Rectification is the spiritual basis of advance, production the material basis; our Party learned rectification and production moving from unconsciousness to consciousness. Our Party is now comparatively united — one may say unprecedentedly united — and the historical questions have been fairly properly settled; but problems remain. I said at the preliminary meeting the other day: our Party is not completely united; we need still higher unity, still higher solidarity. For solidarity there must be democracy: without democracy, without criticism and self-criticism, without getting the views clear, solidarity is impossible. Many unfair things must gradually become fair. Every day has its unfairness, so every day we must solve problems. Problems are solved and arise again, arise and are solved — that is how we advance. The leading comrades of the Central Committee and of the leading organs at all levels must attend to what people say: like a house, the windows must often be opened to let fresh air in. Why is our fresh air insufficient? Blame the air, or blame us? Air is always moving; if we do not open the windows, fresh air is insufficient; open them, and the air will come into the house. What sort of house is ours? A political house, a political factory. Running a factory requires raw materials, workers, technicians and engineers. If raw materials are short, if personnel are short, think of your own responsibility. Was an advertisement posted? Was it big enough? Was a high price offered for raw materials? In fact the raw materials cost nothing: post the word “Welcome,” and they flow in without end. So let every sort of opinion be expressed: “say all you know and say it without reserve; blame not the speaker but take warning from his words; correct what you have, and be on guard without” — old sayings, but full of meaning. Let me declare: if anyone speaks beautifully and does not deliver, and does not practise what he preaches himself, then it is wrong.

On individuality and Party spirit: Party spirit is the universal, individuality the particular. There is no universal that is not built on the basis of the particular. Without the particular, where is the universal? Without the individuality of the members, where is Party spirit? Party spirit is the common quality, the universal quality, the quality every member of the whole Party has. For instance unity of policy — the programme of a coalition government, of new democracy, the programmes of the various parts, rectification, production — on these principles, on the basis of Marxist thought, we are united: that is the common part. But are the individual members not different? Of course they are different. Individuality cannot be forced into sameness: people differ — old and young, men and women, all sorts; the work differs — military, political, economic, cultural, Party affairs. Within military work there are commanders, political workers, logistics personnel; within Party work there are different theatres — base areas, enemy-occupied areas. People differ too in their degree of understanding of Marxism, and the same person in youth and in age understands it differently. In short there are differences of work, of position, of sex, of age, and so on; to obliterate these differences is to forbid comrades to develop their strong points. None of these can be unified onto a single track. The solar system has nine great planets — Venus, Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, Pluto, and the Earth as well. Each runs its own orbit in fixed order; all were formed by splitting from the solar nebula, differing in size and shape. As for what is on the planets, that is not all the same either. On the sun there are no people; on our Earth there are. Whether on any of the other eight planets there are also people, one cannot now say — I have made no investigation. In remote antiquity the Earth too had no people, no water, no air; only when there were air and water could there be living things, and with living things, people. The stars in the sky often assert their independence too: look up some night and sometimes you will see one run off! It too asserts its independence. In short, Party members have all sorts of individualities, and whoever obliterates them is wrong. To obliterate the differences is in the end to abolish unity: blot out the particular and there is no universal. That is one question.

Second question: about several sections of cadres within the Party. There are several sections of cadres who ordinarily feel they are not treated quite fairly, and toward these sections of comrades we must pay special attention.

(1) Theoretical workers. Our rectification stressed seeking truth from facts and opposed dogmatism; with that swing, it seems the theoretical workers no longer prosper. We should value theoretical workers, value theory. Lenin said: “Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.” So our Party must study theory. I said at the Sixth Plenary Session that our Party's theoretical level was very low; now it is somewhat higher than before, but still not enough. Of course the Party has made some progress, but measured by the demands of the Chinese revolutionary movement our theoretical level is not enough. Revolution requires us to be able to expound the Chinese revolutionary movement, expound its every aspect, expound its inner connections — military, political, cultural, economic, every side of the whole revolutionary work and its inner connections — and to sum up experience and raise it up, making it methodical and systematic. What is theory? Systematic knowledge. The theory of Marxism-Leninism is systematic knowledge founded on Marxism.

Comrades doing translation work are very important; do not think translation work is lowly. We now need great translators. I am a rustic; to know a little of affairs abroad I must still rely on translators. In our Party, those who can read foreign books directly are few; whoever can should first translate the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, translate the advanced things of the Soviet Union and the works of the Marxists of various countries. And much from history — though not Marxist, yet of progressive significance — and the works of some democrats: all these we must translate.

Hence we must value the theoretical workers, look up to them, regard them as people of great learning and cultivation in our ranks, and respect them.

(2) Intellectuals. Intellectuals are not all theoretical workers. That intellectuals are increasing in our Party is a very good thing. For a class revolution to triumph, without intellectuals it is impossible. You have read Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the Water Margin: of the three kingdoms Wei, Shu and Wu, each had its intellectuals — high-level intellectuals and ordinary ones; he who wore the Eight Trigrams robes and held the goose-feather fan was an intellectual. Liangshan Marsh without Gongsun Sheng, Wu Yong and Xiao Rang would not do — though without the others it would not do either. For the proletariat to rise, the toiling masses must have intellectuals; every class must have intellectuals to serve it. The slave-owners had intellectuals serving them — the sages of the slave-owners, like Aristotle and Socrates of Greece. Our Chinese slave-owners also had intellectuals serving them: Zhou Gongdan was the sage of the slave-owners. And the feudal age's Zhuge Liang and Liu Bowen, and the Water Margin's Wu Yong, were intellectuals of feudal society. Because of the rectification and the cadre screening, the intellectuals seem to have been pressed down a little — not quite fair. Like a balance: this side a little low, that side a little high. Our Congress should set it upright, raising the side of the intellectuals a little. Should it be reversed? No. We should welcome them to serve our Party, to struggle for our Party's interests, for the interests of the people. Our Party, our army, our government, our economic departments, our mass organizations should absorb the broad intellectuals into our service, and we should respect them.

(3) Comrades who worked in the enemy-occupied areas and the Kuomintang areas. When such comrades arrive in the base areas they feel out of place. In the base areas chiefs are everywhere: at the theatre the chiefs always sit in front — big chiefs, middle chiefs, little chiefs — and these comrades chafe inside. At the cadre screening they had a hard time of it too. “Where are you from? Shanghai? Xi'an?” “Any problems?” Looked at over and over, a little doubted. “Which hotel did you stay in?” “Have you a letter of introduction?” Because in our base areas everyone needs a letter of introduction, they imagined hotels in Shanghai required them too — and if you had none, that was very odd indeed. Where we have made mistakes we must say sorry; where the hat was put on the wrong head, we must respectfully take the hat off and admit the error. That these comrades are unaccustomed to the work style of the base areas is understandable; style, I am afraid, will take three or five years slowly to become uniform.

(4) Local cadres, local military cadres. I have written in the report that local cadres must be treated as one's own brothers and sisters. Wherever our army goes it must help the local cadres raise troops — militia, self-defence corps, local regiments, local units — and on that basis main-force regiments, main-force units can be raised. When I first came to northern Shaanxi I at first neglected this question. This Border Region was built up by Comrade Gao Gang and others with their own hands; because I handled the question badly, the Shaanxi people gossiped. Some said the Shaanxi people could only build soviet areas, not command the Red Army. Such talk arose because some of the local troops were handled badly. In North China, Central China, South China — were there places where local cadres and local troops were handled improperly? If so, it should be admitted as wrong and corrected, as I should admit it for northern Shaanxi. These words show that such comrades have suffered grievances. I have advocated investigation and study, yet when I first came to Shaanbei I did none of it in this respect; now we have investigation and study. At the same time I hope the local comrades working in the south and the north, the east and the west will speak up. We must open the windows, let the air circulate, listen to the news, listen to opinion, and correct defects and errors. If this is not done well, nothing works. This question once caused great dissension in our history. After this Congress ends, many more people will be going out to the localities. Last year Wang Shoudao and Wang Zhen went to Hunan, Dai Jiying and Wang Shusheng to Henan — I said these things to them when they set out. Do not fear speaking too much, do not fear wearing out tongue and lips; as it turns out, neither tongue nor lips are worn — we have not said enough. Everyone in this world has defects; even Bolsheviks are not perfect, more or less flawed — and what is that called? A Bolshevik with defects. You can hardly say he is not a Bolshevik. “I fought heroically for the Party — why am I not yet a Marxist-Leninist?” One cannot say that. I think this applies to me too: to say I am a complete Bolshevik is not certain; to say I have not a whiff of the Bolshevik is not so either — many comrades write to me addressing “Bolshevik greetings.” On reflection, we may call ourselves Bolsheviks with defects. Among the defects is one: we carry something on our backs. For instance, having walked more roads — walked twenty-five thousand li — we have added to our baggage. I do not mean every comrade, or any particular comrades — please take no offence. But quite a number of comrades, having walked the twenty-five thousand li, made of it a burden, a load, became hunchbacks because their burden was too great. You walked many roads, but you lost the base area — the Jiangxi base area now is gone; the others did not walk, but Shaanbei is still a base area. Comrade! You walked the roads and threw away the base area; they demand that base area back from you — can you pay? You cannot pay, nor can I. If it were a matter of paying in fabi or bianbi, some way might be found; but to pay back the Jiangxi base area — there is no way at all. The others did not walk, but they have a base area; we walked twenty-five thousand li and have none. You see — roads walked a foot at a time, in the end, become a burden. The Earth walks too: it circles the sun, and with each circuit we gain a year of life; the older we grow, the bigger the burden. Old comrades, do not take offence — I am fifty-two this year, and the road the Earth has walked has become our burden too. The young comrades have their burdens as well. Their eyes are sharp, their ears hear far, quick of eye and hand — that is their strength. But for young comrades to call the old men “senile and decrepit” — that will not do. Young comrades must not call the old men “senile and decrepit,” nor the old men call the young “green and ignorant.” All of us came from youth; the young know little and will little by little know more. What others know is less than what you know, but you do not know everything either. At farming you are no match for Wu Manyou; at work no match for Zhao Zhankui; as a soldier no match for Zhang Zhiguo. Of the tens of millions of things in the world we can do only one or two — there are limits; the things we do not know and cannot do are very many. If we mend our attitude — wherever we go, fuse with the people there, respect the comrades of the place, raise our communist consciousness — we can shrink “mountain-stronghold-ism.” To purge mountain-stronghold-ism we must acknowledge the mountain strongholds and make allowance for them; only so can they be shrunk and eliminated. So we must acknowledge the mountain strongholds — not acknowledging them will not do; having acknowledged, we must make allowance for the various parts, the various groups, the parts of different histories and different questions. If a stone presses on their spirits — and some of the stones were placed there by our own hands — then we must lift the stones off. Whatever stone presses on their spirits, big, middle or little, we must lift it off. Stones laid by our own hands must be lifted by our own hands, so that these comrades are glad at heart, liberated, their enthusiasm brought into play. Only thus can the whole Party be well united, and the whole people of China, and march to victory. To this end, wherever we go, we must not act as imperial commissioners; we must first see other people's strong points. We all belong to the new-democratic liberated areas, all are Communists, all are comrades; there should be no looking down. In the civil-war period we suffered greatly over this. Most of our Yan'an comrades have been through the Party school; you comrades here are delegates to the Seventh Congress and know more — very good. When you go out, people will surely respect you and need you to convey the spirit of the Congress; all eyes will turn to Yan'an, all faith in Yan'an. But comrades, we must adopt exactly the attitude described: no acting as imperial commissioners; wherever we go, “give one's all, till the heart ceases beating.” We have learned from the great pain of history: unconscious blindness is intolerable; we must have consciousness — consciously attend to this. Wherever we go, respect the people of the place, the army of the place, the government of the place; get on well with them. This is the duty of a Communist.

(5) Cadres in economic and logistics work. In the army there is logistics work; throughout the base areas and the liberated areas there is vast economic work, and vast numbers of comrades doing it. Because in the past we did not advocate and publicize this work enough, many comrades feel that those who work in these departments are looked down on and have no standing. I once said: a comrade in Yan'an told me that he was asked to be head of the general-services office and was unwilling — why? Because people looked down on it. Asked what work he did, he said “general work.” Why did he say “general work”? Because general-services work did not prosper. Now we should make it prosper. Some comrades think army work and Party work prosper — in the army, military and political work prosper, while logistics still does not. Because it does not prosper, these comrades should be given proper standing, so that it prospers.

(6) Cadres in mass-movement work — trade-union, youth and women's cadres. These cadres too feel they do not prosper. Some call them “irregular troops,” when in fact they are all “Central Army” — there are no irregulars. Once the big cities are taken, the vast workers' movement, youth movement and women's movement must all unfold. Our Party is the party of the working class; we have already sacrificed many worker comrades, and the cadres left for the workers' movement are few — perhaps a few dozen, a few hundred. We must look after them and respect them. Likewise we cannot do without cadres for youth work and women's work.

(7) Cadres who joined the Party during the war of resistance. We still call them the new cadres, as though the old cadres were only those from the Long March — then there are few “grown-ups,” only one or two myriads. Comrades, the majority of those present are old cadres; because you are rich in experience and your leadership correct, you were chosen as delegates — very good. The comrades who worked in the Great Revolution period and the civil-war period are few in number, yet without them nothing works, for they are rich in experience. But to make of experience a burden is bad — one should travel light. Let me give you a figure! At present those who joined during the war of resistance number over a million and a hundred thousand; those who joined in the Northern Expedition and civil-war periods number at most twenty thousand still; counting, the total is some one million two hundred thousand. The eyes of these twenty thousand must not look only at themselves — they must see that million and more. Otherwise it will be you looking at me and I looking at you, great fun indeed, admiring yourselves in the mirror over and over, thinking yourselves very handsome. Ah, that is not good: we are rather old and not very handsome; they are more handsome, being younger. Most of those who joined during the war of resistance are young comrades, though there are older ones too. We have our strong points, they have theirs: without us nothing works, without them nothing works either. The eyes of the twenty thousand must be on that million and more — respect them; do not let them feel these twenty thousand are unapproachable, hard to talk to, so that before a talk they must think for days and nights how to phrase it. Let them be as Hu Shizhi said: “say whatever there is to say; say it as it should be said” — that is, fuse into one, and unite the new cadres with the old. The war of resistance was a long period; toward the cadres who joined during it, do not lump them all as “new cadres” — if all are “new cadres,” it is as if only I am an old cadre: I, the elder, am first under heaven, and you, the youngster, second.

(8) Non-Party cadres. This too is a big question. If in the whole of China our members numbered four and a half million, they would be only one per cent of the population — and at present our proportion is a fraction of one per cent. Even with four and a half million members, in every hundred people there would be but one Communist. What is his task? His task is to unite the other ninety-nine non-Party people. We must organize the army and strike down the enemy, and for that we must do so. A Communist who cannot unite the majority — the workers, the peasants, the intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie and the other democratic elements — is not a good Communist. Why does the world need a Communist Party? What is the Communist Party for? Is there any necessity for its existence? Ye Qing says the Chinese Communist Party has no need to exist — that is the reactionaries' formulation, and we do not accept it. We ourselves may raise the question of whether the Communist Party is needed: is it because there is too much millet in the world, left over, which we simply must be asked to eat, that the Communist Party is needed? Or because there are too many houses, a batch of which must be set aside for the Communist Party to live in? Of course neither. The world needs the Communist Party precisely to unite the majority of people, to organize the army, to strike down the enemy, to build the new China. What other business is there? None. That is to say, our eating a little millet, a little rice, our wearing a little clothing, are all in order to do things for the people, to unite the broad masses, to organize the army, to defeat the enemy, to build the new China. If revolution is not made this way, then it becomes making revolution solely against the Department of Finance. Some people wage no other revolution but devote themselves single-mindedly, for years on end, to revolutionizing the Department of Finance — that is bad. Comrades, take no offence: I do not mean any one person, or any several. But I have always had this feeling: if we want to do things, we must find out, we must study — above all the various so-called small matters, such as production, health, culture, mass organizations, political power work, all manner of concrete work. Much of what the common people know we must learn; our knowledge is very poor — first of all my own. How salt is transported, I do not quite know; how co-operatives are run, I do not quite know — I have never run one. Hence a task is set us: to learn. Where experience is lacking, study, work, and study in the course of work.

Non-Party people are ninety-nine per cent; only with them making revolution together with us can there be victory — relying on the members alone is hopeless. Is it so? Is it truth? It is entirely truth. Among them are leaders, are cadres. We must help them, cultivate the finest elements of the people, respect them at the same time, and co-operate well with them. Toward these non-Party cadres our leading organs in the various places, and the organization departments, must in future carry out investigation and study and have some methods — methods of education, methods of unity — forums, heart-to-heart talks and the like, to help and cultivate them.

The last question is telling the truth. The other day I said we must be modest and prudent, neither arrogant nor impetuous. Today let me add one point: tell the truth — no stealing, no pretending, no boasting. Stealing is stealing things; pretending is putting on airs — “a scallion stuck up a pig's snout: playing the elephant”; boasting is bragging. Every ordinary person should tell the truth; every Communist should do so all the more.

What is not stealing? I have seen such things: someone takes another person's whole pamphlet, changes a few terms, puts his own name on it, and publishes it as his own. Work that is not one's own claimed as one's own — is that not stealing? Ah, there is a thief! There are thieves in our Party too, of course isolated and few. Such things have existed all along; it is called “plagiarism.” It is dishonesty. What is Marx's is Marx's; what is Engels's is Engels's; Lenin's is Lenin's; Stalin's is Stalin's; what Commander-in-Chief Zhu said is what Zhu said; what Liu Shaoqi said is what Liu Shaoqi said; what Old Xu said is what Old Xu said; what any comrade said is what that comrade said — and no one may steal.

What is not pretending? It is “knowing what you know, and knowing that you do not know.” Confucius's disciple Zilu was a very straightforward man; Confucius said to him: “To know what you know and to know what you do not know — that is knowledge.” To know is to know; not to know is not to know; if you know an inch, say you know an inch — do not claim more. Why does “pretending” appear in the world? Why do some feel that not pretending is rather bad? This is a social phenomenon. Stealing is a social phenomenon; pretending is also a social phenomenon. Pretending is especially common now, and especially common in our Party too. Did the pretender's mother bear him to pretend? While he was in her womb did she vow before the Bodhisattva Guanyin that she must give birth to a son who could pretend? Of course not — it is a social phenomenon. In our Party pretending has never been allowed. Not to know does not matter; to know little does not matter; even to know very little of Marxism-Leninism and to have read very few of the books of Marx and Lenin does not matter — know as much as you know. Here I propose we read five Marxist-Leninist books. One by Marx — the Communist Manifesto, written with Engels but chiefly by Marx. One by Engels — Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Two by Lenin — Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, and “Left-Wing” Communism, an Infantile Disorder. Lenin's two books are very well written, and so are the two by Marx and Engels; all four are slim and take little time to finish. Besides these, the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, compiled under Stalin's direction, is somewhat thicker. That book is historical and also theoretical — it has both history and theory; it is the history of a victorious socialist country, the history of Marxism's success in Russia, and it should be read. The first four books too are both theoretical and historical. The books of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are many; having first read these five, we shall be about there.

And there is no boasting: report the true figure — “report actuals, account actuals.” Have the comrades here not discussed Party history? One comrade said in his speech that during the civil-war period a habit was formed: in reporting work to superiors, one had to paint it a little better, exaggerate a little, for it to look right. In fact that solves no problem. Our work is part of the work of the whole people, part of the work of the whole Party — it belongs to us all, to the people all. Why am I now the chief? Simply that it happened to fall to me to be chief; there is no other reason — Zhang San or Li Si could just as well have been chief, but the lot fell to me. And whose estate is this? Zhang San's? Li Si's? No — the whole Party's, the whole people's. Whose is Yan'an? Yan'an is the whole people's. I once told a non-Party person: some say Yan'an belongs to the Communist Party — that is incorrect. To say the Communist Party is chief here — that is correct, for this realm was won by our leading the common people in battle. “Report actuals, account actuals” demands that our reports be truthful, without lies. Publish the defects of the work under your leadership for all to see — let them come and inspect whether my brigade has horse dung, donkey dung, harmful microbes; if so, sweep a little, wash clean, sweep away bureaucratism. I advocate letting people checkmate us; some things we shall not do unless pressed. Mr. Lu Xun said essays are pressed out of one — unpressed, none get written. But we do not practise the “pressing” of forced confession.

On telling the truth, we now issue a general order: in battle, when guns are captured, report one for one — no inflated figures. Know what you know, know that you do not know; one gun is one gun, two are two — that is knowledge. Once this problem is solved, our Party's style of work can become more solid. We must be honest and true.

Our Communist Party is now a very large party, a party with rich experience from twenty-four years, a party preparing for victory. We shall win victory throughout the country — we have that resolve. Let the whole Party unite and struggle for the liberation of the people of the whole country!