Party Building and Ideological Rectification
This theme gathers four pieces written between December 1929 and 1945, all internal documents about the Party's organisation, its internal ideological state, and its conference policy. The December 1929 'On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party' follows the resolution of the Ninth Congress of the Fourth Red Army. The September 1937 'Combat Liberalism' is a list-like short essay. The other two both come from the Seventh National Congress of 1945.
The opening of 'On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party' says that within the Communist Party of the Fourth Red Army there exist various non-proletarian ideas, which greatly hinder the execution of the Party's correct line. It traces the source of these ideas to two points: first, the largest part of the Party's organisational base is composed of peasants and other petty-bourgeois elements; second, the leading organs lack a united and resolute struggle against these incorrect ideas and lack education of Party members in the correct line. It says the congress, on the spirit of the Central Committee's September letter, points out the manifestations, sources and corrections of the various non-proletarian ideas.
It lists several manifestations and gives a correction for each. On the purely military viewpoint it says the Red Army is by no means merely for fighting; besides destroying the enemy's military strength it bears the heavy tasks of propagandising, organising, arming and helping the masses and even establishing Communist Party organisations. On extreme democratisation it says its danger lies in damaging or even completely destroying the Party's organisation, weakening or even completely destroying its fighting power, so that the Party cannot bear its responsibility, and proposes uprooting the seedling of extreme democratisation in theory.
The September 1937 'Combat Liberalism' opens with 'we stand for active ideological struggle, because it is the weapon for achieving and strengthening the unity of the Party and the revolutionary ranks'. It then lists eleven manifestations: not arguing matters of principle with acquaintances, townsfolk, schoolmates, close friends; criticising behind backs; 'letting things drift if they do not affect one personally and being prudent so as to give offence to no one'; disobedience to orders, one's own opinion first; not arguing back at incorrect opinions; and others.
It also analyses source and nature, saying the source of liberalism lies in the selfishness of the petty bourgeoisie, putting personal interest first and revolutionary interest second; and that such people 'preach Marxism to others but practise liberalism themselves; apply Marxism to others but liberalism to themselves'. The end proposes that a Communist should be open and aboveboard, honest and active, take the revolutionary interest as the first life, subordinate personal interest to the revolutionary interest, and at all times and places uphold correct principles and wage tireless struggle against all incorrect ideas and behaviour.
The 1945 'The Working Policy of the Seventh National Congress' summarises the congress's policy in two phrases: our congress's policy should be — unity and victory. Simply put, one is unity, one is victory. Victory is our goal; unity is our front, our ranks. It also says the chief and leading element in the ranks is our Party; without our Party it would be impossible for the Chinese people to win. The same piece reviews Party history, saying we should start from the goal of unity and reach unity through self-criticism.
The same piece also reviews the historical thread: the founding of the Party, the First Congress, the Northern Expedition, the revolution of 1924, the reorganisation of the Kuomintang and the Whampoa Academy, the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Long March, the Zunyi Conference, the anti-Japanese united front. It says the leadership of the Party is the decisive factor, and we must persist in the policy of long-term co-operation with the Kuomintang. The seventh part discusses the position of the Communist Party in the national war; this is the most-cited section of the piece.