War and the Military

This theme gathers five pieces from 12 October 1938 to 25 October 1958. Their genres differ greatly: one is a congress report, one a surrender demand, three are messages issued in the name of the Ministry of National Defence. All five directly handle combat, ceasefire and the arrangement of shelling.
The 12 October 1938 'On the New Stage' is Mao Zedong's report to the enlarged Sixth Plenum. The second part sums up fifteen months of the war, holding: first, the war of resistance is long, not short, so the strategic principle is protracted war, not quick decision; second, China's war of resistance can win final victory, the defeatists having no ground; third, the path to victory lies in uniting and rallying the whole nation, striving to advance and relying on the masses.
The report also compares the theories of quick victory and long war, saying that at the start of the resistance many, not starting from the basic contrast of enemy and our strength but from several transient and superficial phenomena, imagined the war would soon be settled and the idea of quick victory prevailed for a time. The report also discusses forms of fighting, saying in the new stage the main force army holds the front defence while guerrilla war behind the enemy will temporarily become the main form; in certain important strategic areas we will meet the enemy's cruel attacks, large formations will be hard to keep in the plains, and the mountains will become the main base areas.
The December 1948 'Urging Du Yuming and Others to Surrender' is signed by the headquarters of the Central Plains People's Liberation Army, addressed to Generals Du Yuming, Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi and the regimental, battalion and company commanders of the Qiu and Li corps. It first states the battlefield situation, that the Huang Wei corps was utterly wiped out on the evening of the 15th and the Li Yannian corps has turned south; and that your aeroplanes and tanks are of no use either, we have more aeroplanes and tanks than you — these are called 'earthen aeroplanes' and 'earthen tanks', made of artillery and explosives.
It also lists the numbers of losses on both sides, saying you have altogether lost thirty-four divisions, of which, apart from several that mutinied or surrendered, the remaining twenty-seven and a half divisions were all annihilated by this army; and that the ends of the Huang Baitao, Huang Wei and Sun Yuanliang corps you have seen with your own eyes. The end sets the terms: order the whole army to lay down its weapons and stop resisting at once; this army can guarantee the personal safety of your senior commanders and all officers and men; only thus is there your sole way out.
The three 1958 messages are different again. The 6 October 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan from the Ministry of National Defence', signed by Defence Minister Peng Dehuai, opens with 'we are all Chinese. Of the thirty-six stratagems, alliance is best', and says the Jinmen fighting is of a punitive nature. It announces that, for humanitarian reasons, it has ordered the Fujian front, from 6 October, for a provisional period of seven days, to stop shelling, and you may send supplies freely, provided there is no American escort.
The same message also proposes negotiations, saying the war between you and us has lasted thirty years and is not yet ended, which is not good, and proposes holding talks for a peaceful settlement; it says this is a matter between the two sides, the Kuomintang and the Communists, not between China and the US — the US occupation of Penghu and the Taiwan Strait is the China-US matter. It says Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu are part of China, not another country; in the world there is only one China, not two.
The 13 October 'Order of the Ministry of National Defence' also signed by Peng Dehuai, says the shelling of Jinmen is suspended for another two weeks from this day to observe the enemy's movements and let the military and civilian compatriots of Jinmen be fully supplied, including food and military equipment, to help them hold their ground; it says this is to deal with the Americans, and the Sino-US line must be drawn clearly. The message's end rules that in the Jinmen waters no American escort is permitted; if there is an escort, fire at once.
The 25 October 'Third Message to Compatriots in Taiwan from the Ministry of National Defence' extends the scope of the shelling halt: it rules that on even days no shelling occurs, and shelling is uniformly done on odd days, with some targets perhaps not shelled even on odd days. It says Premier Zhou Enlai proposed holding peace talks with you two years earlier, for a reasonable settlement of the historical dispute between the two parties; and that our peace talks are genuine — once concluded, the civil war can be declared ended and all Chinese unite against the external threat.
Read in sequence, the five pieces show a difference in manner: the 1938 report is analysis and summation, using 'protracted war', 'quick decision', 'guerrilla war'; the 1948 surrender demand lists battle situations and terms; the three 1958 messages alternately arrange the stopping and resumption of shelling and repeatedly state the conditions of escort and negotiation. The three messages, nineteen days apart, were all issued in the name of the Ministry of National Defence.
Editor's note: this page is read across by theme; excerpts are taken verbatim from the base text. Each piece's date follows the base text and common cataloguing. The three 1958 messages were issued in the name of the Ministry of National Defence, signed by Peng Dehuai; this page reproduces them. It only states what each piece writes, and offers no evaluation of these military actions.